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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS START-UPS
USING THE KAUFFMAN FIRM SURVEY
by
Indu Khurana
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Peter Thompson, Major Professor
This dissertation focused on the longitudinal analysis of business start-ups using
three waves of data from the Kauffman Firm Survey.
The first essay used the data from years 2004-2008, and examined the
simultaneous relationship between a firm’s capital structure, human resource policies,
and its impact on the level of innovation. The firm leverage was calculated as, debt
divided by total financial resources. Index of employee well-being was determined by a
set of nine dichotomous questions asked in the survey. A negative binomial fixed effects
model was used to analyze the effect of employee well-being and leverage on the count
data of patents and copyrights, which were used as a proxy for innovation. The paper
demonstrated that employee well-being positively affects the firm's innovation, while a
higher leverage ratio had a negative impact on the innovation. No significant relation was
found between leverage and employee well-being.
The second essay used the data from years 2004-2009, and inquired whether a
higher entrepreneurial speed of learning is desirable, and whether there is a linkage
between the speed of learning and growth rate of the firm. The change in the speed of
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learning was measured using a pooled OLS estimator in repeated cross-sections. There
was evidence of a declining speed of learning over time, and it was concluded that a
higher speed of learning is not necessarily a good thing, because speed of learning is
contingent on the entrepreneur's initial knowledge, and the precision of the signals he
receives from the market. Also, there was no reason to expect speed of learning to be
related to the growth of the firm in one direction over another.
The third essay used the data from years 2004-2010, and determined the timing of
diversification activities by the business start-ups. It captured when a start-up diversified
for the first time, and explored the association between an early diversification strategy
adopted by a firm, and its survival rate. A semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard
model was used to examine the survival pattern. The results demonstrated that firms
diversifying at an early stage in their lives show a higher survival rate; however, this
effect fades over time.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent evidence shows that a large number of small businesses start every year,
and approximately 40%-50% of them make it to their fifth year (Dunne et al., 1989;
Knaup, 2007; Mata & Portugal, 1994; Romanelli, 1989).
Amongst the firms that survive the initial years, a small percentage of them grow,
innovate, and choose to diversify. Despite the growing interest in the young business
survival and growth, little is known about the dynamics of a business start-up in the
initial stages. Because of the complexity involved in the data collection, there has been an
informational gap in the research between “small and young” firms, and “large and
established” business formations.
In an effort to better understand the dynamics of new businesses in the United
States, the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation sponsored the Kauffman Firm Survey
(KFS), which is a panel study of new businesses founded in 2004 (Robb et al., 2010). The
original sample in the KFS consists of 4,928 firms, and it contains detailed information
on both, the entrepreneurs and the firms; making it the world's largest data on small
businesses. Availability of the KFS makes it possible to analyze the founding conditions
of the start-ups, and track their performance subsequent to their birth. These firms are at
the cusp of childhood and adolescence, which makes the study of this unique data of
special interest to both, researchers and policy makers alike. The dataset offers an
opportunity to study a cohort of firms, all born in the same time period, maturing at the
same pace, and facing the same macroeconomic shocks.
My dissertation makes use of the KFS dataset, and analyzes the dynamics of startups in the initial years. One of the important features of the KFS is that it adds data
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annually to the base year survey conducted in 2005. Consequently, three waves of data
have been used to address three different issues relevant to the start-ups.
The first essay makes use of data from 2004-2008, and explores the linkage
between: capital structure, innovation, and employee well-being. Business start-ups face
credit constraints in the initial years of existence. One of the major reasons for this is
their lack of credibility in the financial market. Regular supply of funds is important for
the firm’s survival and growth. In addition to the financial resources, organizational
practices, and employee satisfaction likewise contribute to a higher level of innovation.
Accordingly, this essay examines the simultaneous relationship between the firm
leverage 1 and employee well-being; and their impact on innovation. To measure the
employee well-being, a set of nine dichotomous questions is used. These questions
explore whether a firm provides fringe benefits to its employees or not. Total number of
patents and copyrights held by a firm at the end of each year are used to measure the level
of innovation. Firm leverage is calculated as total debt divided by the total financial
resources.
A negative binomial fixed effects model is used to analyze the effect of employee
well-being and leverage on the count data of patents and copyrights. The paper
demonstrates that employee well-being positively affects the level of innovation. In
contrast, a higher leverage ratio has a negative impact on the innovation. To counter the
argument that non-monetary benefits act as a substitute for monetary payments, the study
controls for the average wages. Even after controlling for the wages, the coefficient of
employee well-being is positive and statistically significant. No significant relation is
1

Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity.
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found between leverage and employee well-being. The argument of employee welfare
guiding the debt-equity ratio does not work for young firms. Further, it is reported that
because of varying debt levels and declining equity, leverage ratio rises with the age of
the firm.
The second essay focuses on the speed of entrepreneurial learning. Researchers
have shown that there is evidence that an entrepreneur learns the tricks of the trade as
time passes. Efficient entrepreneurs identify the opportunities offered by the market,
which gets reflected in the growth of the business. Building on this evidence, it becomes
crucial to identify how fast an entrepreneur learns, and adjusts his beliefs to the new
information received from the environment. Further, if an entrepreneur learns at a faster
speed, does he generate better results for the business? These questions are unraveled by
building on the model of entrepreneurial learning developed by Parker (2006). My study
investigates whether the speed of entrepreneurial learning is the same across time and
groups; and whether the firm’s growth is altered by this learning.
Changes in the speed of learning are measured across factors measuring
individual-, market-, and industry-specific characteristics. Initial six years (2004-2009) of
data are used for the present study. Using a pooled OLS estimator in repeated crosssections, there is clear evidence of declining speed of learning over time, which is also in
consonance with the framework of Bayesian learning. Results across the groups remain
the same even after controlling for survivorship bias. It is concluded that a higher speed
of learning is not necessarily a good thing, because the speed of learning is contingent on
the entrepreneur's initial knowledge, and the precision of the signals he receives from the
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market. Also, there is no reason to expect speed of learning to be related to the growth of
the firm in one direction over another.
The third essay focuses on the diversification activities undertaken by the young
firms. There is an established line of research that explores the kind of diversification
strategies firms adopt; motivation behind choosing diversification as a preferred strategy
for growth; and measuring whether, and how it influences the performance of a firm
(Ansoff, 1957, 1958; Chandler, 1962; Gort, 1962; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989;
Montgomery, 1994; Palich et al., 2000). Most of these questions are answered for large
and established firms; in contrast, there is a gap in the literature that deals with
diversification activities undertaken by the young and small businesses. There are
apparent differences in the large and small firms, and these differences become more
prominent when compared with the business start-ups. Formulating policies for young
businesses, based on empirical research on large firms will not yield accurate results
(Lynn & Reinsch, 1990). One of the questions that an entrepreneur of a young firm faces
is: “When to diversify”? Therefore, third essay explores at what stage a business start-up
diversifies, and whether there is an association between the timing of diversification, and
firm survival.
To study the impact of industry concentration and urbanization in the labor
market area, the County Business Patterns data from the U.S. Census Bureau is merged
with the KFS. A Cox Proportional Hazard model is used to ascertain the relation between
diversification and survival. The empirical results in this study provide evidence that
majority of firms (62%) diversify in the first year. Also, the firms diversifying at an early
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stage in their lives show a higher survival rate. However, this effect fades over time, and
therefore shows no persistence.
My dissertation presents some policy recommendations to the organizations2 that
provide financial support, training and assistance to the small and young businesses. In
the first essay, fluctuating levels of debt imply lack of readily available funds. These
organizations should try to provide a smooth flow of funds to business start-ups. The
amount of collateral money for a loan should also be decreased for a start-up. Large
amounts of collateral as a requirement de-motivates an entrepreneur to apply for funds.
Further, there is a need to educate the entrepreneurs about the availability of loans and
financial services; because 18% of the entrepreneurs in the study never applied for credit
when they needed it (Robb et al., 2009).
An important implication gained from the second essay is that, it is advisable to
guide and assist start-ups in the initial years when entrepreneurs are open to the concept
of learning, and assign more weight to the market signals. There is evidence that early
assistance and guidance does affect the venture performance (Roper & Hart, 2005).
The third essay contributes to the existing knowledge of firm survival by adding
the dimension of diversification, and its timing by business start-ups. Owners of the startups get a better perspective of when to diversify. Diversification can be a strategy for
young firms seeking growth, or seeking a mere survival in the industry. In both cases,
“when to diversify” is an important decision that an owner has to make. Owners will be
better able to evaluate their chances of success, once they know when to undertake
diversification activities.
2

The Small Business Administration, The SCORE Association (Service Corps of Retired Executives), The
Kauffman Foundation, The Coleman Foundation.
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Chapter 1: Is “Leverage” Leveraging the Business Start-ups?
1.1

Introduction
Innovation is considered to play a crucial role in the firm’s survival and growth.

For established firms, innovation is a way to retain their competitive edge in the market
(Christensen, 1997); and for young firms, it is a way to discover new products and
services in new markets (Cefis & Marsili, 2005). Highlighting the relevance of
innovation, Porter (1990) mentions that, one of three cornerstones of global
competitiveness is innovation; the other two being continuous improvement and change.
Researchers have investigated the factors that affect a firm's level of innovation.
Over the years, various reasons have come up that range from, the size of the firm to the
structure of the market (Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Cohen & Klepper, 1996; Huynh et al.,
2008; Koski et al., 2009; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Smith, 2010).
However, there is a gap in the literature that addresses the impact of two variables
together on innovation. These are: financial structure and human resource policies. This
paper addresses the linkage between capital-mix 3 and employee well-being, and their
simultaneous impact on the level of innovation. My study is motivated from the literature
on the above mentioned two variables, whose effect on innovation has been examined
individually, however, have never been analyzed together.
Analyzing the first linkage, controlling for the initial level of patents and
copyrights, Smith (2010), analyzes the role of bank loans and debt, and their subsequent
relation to the level of innovation. Using a logit analysis, she registers a positive impact
of leverage on innovation.
3

Capital mix is the ratio of debt to equity (DER), and is also known as leverage, DER=Debt/(Debt+Equity)
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Further, in addition to the financial resources, human resource policies also affect
a firm's performance (Laursen & Foss, 2003; Therrien, 2003). Organizational structure
and human resource practices that foster new ideas in the workers can help a firm in
achieving a higher level of innovation. Human resource practices per se might not
generate innovation, but they do motivate employees to come up with new ideas (Zoghi
et al., 2010). Therefore, it justifies studying the impact of these human resource practices
and employment relations on innovation, in addition to the financial resources.
Following the importance of human resource practices, Koski et al., (2009) in
their study on 398 Finnish firms, explore the linkage between organizational factors and
innovation. They find that practices that improve employee welfare affect innovation
positively in small firms, whereas, large firms do not show this positive effect. They
conclude that large firms have a decentralized decision-making structure that does not
motivate employees.
Linking up the above two variables that affect innovation, Verwijmeren &
Derwall (2009) suggest an inverse relationship between employee well-being and
leverage. Using the KLD STATS database for their study, they argue that the risk of
bankruptcy, which is bad for employees, motivates a firm to keep lower levels of
leverage. They indicate that firms experience financial distress when they cannot fulfill
their fixed financial payments in the form of debt. Therefore, in an event of bankruptcy,
employees have to suffer monetary losses, and face the risk of losing their jobs.
Consequently, firms that care more about its employees will take lower amounts of debt,
and inject higher amounts of equity, which will eventually reduce the probability of
bankruptcy.
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Observing the associations in the above-mentioned studies, the present essay
examines a three-way linkage between, firm leverage, innovation, and employee wellbeing, amongst the firms that are in their fifth year of existence. Start-ups face a higher
risk of bankruptcy, and eventual exit from the market. The questions examined in this
study are: will a start-up formulate a policy lower debt level just because it cares for its
employees; or choose a capital mix ratio that will yield a higher level of innovation?
Analyzing the first linkage longitudinally, this study reports that, for young firms,
higher leverage has a negative impact on the level of innovation, whereas, a favorable
human resource policy affects innovation positively. However, the same set of policies
has no impact on the capital mix of the firm. Therefore the argument of employee welfare
guiding the debt-equity ratio does not work for young firms. Even though the index
measuring the well-being of employees increases, leverage shows an upward trend. The
risk of bankruptcy pressing a firm to have lower levels of debt would be justified for
large publicly traded firms, but does not seem to be a reasonable answer in case of small
and young firms.
Results of this analysis contribute to the literature in four ways. First, the study
documents an important role played by leverage for young firms; and the risk associated
with higher amounts of debt and lesser equity levels. In the current paper, leverage ratio
increases with the age of the firm, whereas a fluctuating pattern is witnessed for total
debt. Equity on the other hand, tends to decline with the age of the firm. Further, with
capital constraints binding in the initial years, young firms do not target at an “optimal
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ratio”4 of external borrowings to financial resources. Fluctuating level of debt, along with
decreasing equity, obstructs the regular supply of funds, thereby preventing innovation by
start-ups.
Second, an increase in leverage should be interpreted with caution, because the
increase can come either from increasing the debt, or by decreasing the owner's equity.
Changing levels of debt does not allow a firm to take advantage of the leverage that
comes with using debt as a part of its capital structure. Further, small and young firms
lack the cushion that can support them in case of a macroeconomic shock. Therefore, the
trend depicted by both, debt and equity, is justified when linked to the financial turmoil in
2007, and the current economic environment.
Third, from the perspective of the organizations that lend and assist small and
young businesses, fluctuating levels of debt imply the lack of readily available funds.
Debt being the largest source of funding for the firms in the KFS highlights the
importance of liquid credit markets. But fluctuating levels of debt also point towards a
lack of regular flow of funds. The reason for this is, when asked during the survey,
owners reported that, in most cases their loan applications were denied because of lack of
collateral, and poor credit history. Owners also reported that their applications were
denied because of inadequate documentation and even on the basis that it is a new
business. These organizations should try to provide a smooth flow of funds to business
start-ups. Large amounts of collateral as a requirement makes it difficult for an
entrepreneur to consider a loan as a measure of finance.

4

There is no exact value of debt-equity ratio which can be termed as optimal; generally it varies with
industries.
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Further, there is a need to educate the entrepreneurs about the availability of loans
and financial services. Approximately 18% of the entrepreneurs in the study never
applied for credit when they needed it. Owners mentioned that they were pessimistic
about their loan application, and thought that it would be denied. Therefore,
entrepreneurs should be made aware of the available financial resources, and motivated
to apply for debt, which is a lesser expensive option when compared to equity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 gives a detailed
analysis of the three variables and linkages involved in them. Section 1.3 describes the
data and how the indices of employee well-being and innovation are constructed. The
empirical estimation in section 1.4 is followed by the conclusion in section 1.5.
1.2

Literature
Differences in the intellectual property between large and small firms have been

considered to originate from the differences in the market concentration, barriers to entry,
cash flows, and firm size (Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Cohen et al., 1989; Cohen & Klepper,
1996; Galbraith, 1952; Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994). Despite intensive research into
this area, there is no agreement on whether it is large or small firms that are more
innovative, and undertake more research.
Regardless of the firm’s size, finance plays an important role in survival, and
future growth of the firm. With current research5 incorporating financial frictions into the
study of firm dynamics, it becomes useful to include the capital structure of a firm while
5

Cooley and Quadrini (2001) added financial frictions in the study of firm dynamics and found that
leverage ratios decline with firm's age. Hopenhayn (1992), Albuquere and Hopenhayn (2004) included
financial constraints into the study of firm growth and survival. Huynh and Petrunia (2010) extended the
work of Hopenhayn (1992) and studied the impact of debt-to-asset ratio on firm's growth and found a
positive and non-linear relation between them. Cabral and Mata (2003) also studied the impact of financial
constraints on size dynamics.
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analyzing the innovation levels. Innovation activities by small and young firms are often
restrained by inadequate funds. The literature has linked the capital-mix puzzle with the
level of research and development (R&D) activities a firm undertakes. Examining the
effect of leverage on the listed firms in the U.S., Singh & Faircloth (2005) show that
leverage affects R&D negatively. Using a German dataset, Czarnitzki & Kraft (2004)
also document a negative influence of leverage on research and development. In a crosssectional analysis considering the R&D activities of high-technology firms, Chiao (2002)
finds a negative impact of debt. Yet, for non-high-technology companies, he finds a
positive impact. In contrast, Mac An Bhaird & Lucey (2006), using data on Irish firms,
find no relation between R&D activities and leverage. There are contradictory results
with different datasets, and different geographical locations.
But does the capital-mix really matter for business start-ups? Do young
businesses actually set their debt-equity mix, keeping in mind what level of innovation
they want to achieve? Generally firms focus not just on financial capital, but also include
the aspect of human capital while deciding the level of innovation. This justifies
including the effect of human resource policies, along with the effect of financial
structure on innovation in this study.
Researchers have reported that interactive human resource practices (Black &
Lynch, 2004), better employee-management communications, decentralized decisionmaking (Laursen & Foss, 2003), information-sharing programs, and incentive pay plans
(Zoghi et al., 2010) increase innovation. Despite the fact that better human resource
polices promote innovation, studies reported above fail to account for them in their
analysis.
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Researchers who believe that innovation is a function of a firm’s ability to create,
manage, and maintain knowledge (Smith et al., 2005), assign all the weight to the human
resources and policies affecting them (Koski et al., 2009). Lazear & Oyer (2007) suggest
that, “good performance can then be rewarded through a variety of mechanisms,
including increases in base salary, subjectively determined bonus payments, or
promotions.”
Further, there is supporting evidence in the literature that a higher level of
leverage puts the employees of the company at risk (Berk et al., 2010; El Ghoul et al.,
2010). When a company goes bankrupt, one of the most pressing issues for the
liquidators is how much compensation will go to the employees. In line with the above
argument, this study examines, are there any “human costs to bankruptcy” (Berk et al.,
2010)?
The three variables discussed above have been well researched and tested for their
significance individually. However, the linkages between leverage, employee well-being,
and innovation have not been held to an empirical scrutiny with one coherent data-set,
especially for business start-ups. Linking up the three directions, there seems to be some
discrepancy between employee well-being and leverage on one hand, and innovation and
leverage on the other (Figure 1.1).
My study explores how employee well-being, which is purely a subjective
measure; and leverage, which deals with the financial structure, affects the innovation
trajectory of the start-ups. The next section describes the sample, and how these variables
are created.
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Innovation

(+)

Employee Well-Being

(+) ???

(-) ???

Leverage

Figure 1.1 Relation Between three variables, before analysis

1.3

Sample Description
1.3.1 Data-set
The study uses the KFS, which is a panel data on 4,928 firms, all of which began

operation in year 2004. Because all the firms in the KFS started at the same time, the data
do not suffer from inherent survivor bias (Smith, 2010). At the end of the project, the
KFS will contain a detailed data record spanning the period of 2004-2013. The base-line
survey was conducted in 2005, and since then there have been six subsequent follow-ups.
The sample size has declined over these years with reasons varying from, problems in
locating a firm in the follow-up periods, non-responses, or because of a firm’s exit. In the
survey, for a firm to be considered as a start-up it should have satisfied any of the five
criteria in 2004: (i) paid state unemployment taxes, (ii) paid Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) Taxes, (iii) had a legal status, (iv) used an Employer
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Identification Number EIN, or (v) used schedule C to report business income. A firm is
excluded from the survey if it reports any of these five criteria prior to 20046.
To ensure that only start-ups were included in the survey, owners were asked7 to
report whether the business (i) was started as a new business, branch or a subsidiary
owned by an existing business, (ii) was inherited, (iii) was started as a new independent
business, (iv) was purchased as an existing business or, (v) was purchased as a franchise,
(vi) or was an organization designed for social and charitable objectives and established
as “non-profit”. If the responses fell under category (i), (ii) or (vi), respondents were
excluded from the sample.
The present study focuses on data collected in the first five years of a firm's
existence (calendar years 2004-2008). It accounts for firm attrition, and only includes
permanent failure. Refusals and non-responses have also been excluded from the data-set
to maintain consistency in defining failure. Accordingly, 191 firms (see Table1.1) are
taken out from the sample because, (i) they temporarily went out of business, (ii) of nonresponse/refusal, (iii) they were merged with another business or sold, or (iv) they had
missing data. Further, 76 firms are dropped from the sample because they reported no
sales or revenue in all these years.
Moreover, 20 firms are dropped that reported no owner8 in all five years. A total
of 1,110 firms are lost as natural attrition. Also, firms with no funds in the business are
taken off from the sample, and accordingly a total of 55 firms are deleted. One can argue
6

For details on survey design and construction, refer to DesRoches et al., (2008); Robb et al., (2009, 2010)

7

A detailed set of questions asked during the survey, relevant to this study has been listed in the Appendix

8

Owner has been defined as a person who is actively involved in running the business
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that firms operating in the services sector may not require a significant percentage of
funds or assets to operate. Keeping this in mind, their level of sales, revenue generated,
and profit made, was cross-checked, and they all recorded a zero value. By the end of the
fifth year, the sample size is reduced to 3,361 firms.
Table 1.1 Firms Going Out of Business
Firms Going Out of Business: Description

2005

2006

2007

2008

Sold

0

0

0

23

Merged

0

0

0

14

18

20

41

73

Unspecified Reason

0

1

0

1

No Owner in all 5 years

-

-

-

20

No Revenue in all 5 years

-

-

-

76

No Funds invested in all 5 years

-

-

-

55

Natural Attrition

-

-

-

1,110

Temporarily stopped working

1.3.2 Variable Construction
1.3.2.1 Index of employee well-being
To measure favorable human resource policies in the firm, an index of employee
well-being is constructed. It is derived from a set of nine dichotomous questions asked
during survey. These include, did the business offer: (i) a bonus plan to its employees, (ii)
an alternative work schedule, (iii) a health insurance plan, (iv) other benefits, (v) paid
sick days, (vi) paid vacations, (vii) a retirement plan, (viii) stock options, and (ix) tuition
reimbursement.
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Responses to these questions are coded as “yes” = 1, and “no” = 0. The counts of
“1” are added to create an index for employee well-being. The KFS reports information
on both full-time and part-time employees. Therefore, for each set of employees, there
are nine questions. The index of well-being can take a minimum value of “0” when the
answer to all the questions is “no”, and the maximum of eighteen, where all the questions
are answered as “yes”, and each get a score of “1” (for both full-time and part-time
employees). Figure 1.2 shows the pattern of index of employee well-being over five
years, where it is increasing for the first four years, and then shows a slight decline in the
fifth year. Descriptive statistics of variables are provided in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Mean

Min

Max

S.D.

Number of Employees

2.96

0

55

5.65

Full Time Employees

2.08

0

40

4.68

Part Time Employees

0.87

0

28

2.33

Revenue (x 100,000)

2.47

0

10

3.18

Intangible Assets

0.35

0

5

0.48

Total Assets (x 100,000)

2.19

0

10

2.97

0.41

0

1

0.44

Credit Rating

2.91

1

5

0.92

Innovation (Sum of patents & Copyrights)

1.71

0

250

12.90

Employee Well-Being

2.67

0

17

5.65

Work Experience

13.74

0

40

10.47

Education

15.07

0

21

2.71

Age

46.81

21

79

10.71

Firm Size

Asset Structure

Financial Structure
Leverage (Debt/Total Financing Sources)
Firm-Specific Variables

Entrepreneur Specific Variables
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1.3.2.2 Level of innovation
The KFS distinctly asks the owners to report, “How many patents and copyrights
does the business have at the end of the year?” This constructed variable measures the
total number of patents and copyrights held by a firm at the end of each year and is used
to measure innovation. Patents and copyrights are one of the most commonly used
methods to assess the level of intellectual property of a firm (Acs et al., 2002). However,
there are two issues that could not be addressed with this variable construction. First, the
nature of the data-set does not allow identifying the patent citations. Therefore, patent
quality as an issue could not be addressed in the study (Trajtenberg, 1990). Second, the
survey does not report how many patents and copyrights did the firm apply for, and how
many were obtained. So, there is no way to demarcate the patents applied for, and actual
patents granted. Figure 1.3 shows the pattern of this constructed variable measuring
innovation, where in year 2006 and 2007, there is a sharp increase in innovation,
followed by a sharp decline in 2007.
1.3.2.3 Financial variables and firm-specific controls
Firm leverage is calculated as total debt divided by the total financing resources.
Total debt includes: (i) total debt by the owner, and (ii) total business debt. Total debt
(see Figure 1.5) of the owner includes: (i) personal credit card balances, (ii) personal
loans obtained from bank or family members or any other creditor, (iii) business credit
cards under which owner is accountable. Total business debt includes: (i) credit card
balances established for the business, (ii) bank loans for the business, (iii) credit line of
business, and (iv) any other kind of loans taken under the business name (such as family,
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government, employees, other businesses). Total financial resources are a sum of total
debt and total equity. Total equity (see Figure 1.6) includes total asset base of the firm: (i)
total equity of the owner operator, and (ii) total equity of the non-owner operators.
Debt remained the dominant source of financing for start-ups, which is evident
from the fact that in the first year alone, firms injected around $80,000 worth of resources
in the form of debt. Leverage shows a sharp increase in the first follow-up year. The same
pattern is witnessed in the rest of the follow-up years (see Figure 1.4 & Table 1.3).
To overcome the problem of non-response, the KFS uses range values 9 if the
respondent could not, or would not provide the answer regarding the exact figure.
Therefore, midpoints from these ranges are used to calculate total debt and total equity. A
midpoint from the range values has been used earlier, and is supported by the literature
(Kennickell, 1997; Lemieux et al., 2009).

Table 1.3 Range of Debt-Equity Ratio
Debt-Equity Ratio (DER)

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Number of firms with zero DER

1,450

1,296

1,178

1,130

1,058

Number of firms with DER = 0.5

476

235

187

129

128

Number of firms with DER = 1

329

704

796

805

811

9

Range definition: (Range-Value) (1-$500 or less) (2-$501 to $1,000) (3-$1,001 to $3,000) (4-$3,001 to
$5,000) (5-$5,001 to $10,000) (6-$10,001 to $25,000) (7-$25,001 to $100,000) (8-$100,001 to $1,000,000)
(9-$1,000,001 or more)
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Figure 1.2 Employee Well Being

Figure 1.3 Innovation

Figure 1.4 Debt-Equity Ratio

Figure 1.5 Total Debt

Figure 1.6 Total Equity
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Research and Development (R&D) expenditure is generally considered as a
primary measure of innovative activity (VanPraag & Versloot, 2007). To capture the
extent to which a firm is committed to improving its technological capabilities, a measure
of intangible assets is included. It is calculated by dividing the number of employees in
the R&D section, by the total number of employees in the firm. Initial asset base is a
cause of divergence in survival and growth rates of the firms. Firms with a large initial
asset base can provide the necessary funds required for innovation. Therefore, total assets
are included in the study. Following the literature, total number of employees is used to
represent the firm size (Geroski et al., 2007; Mata and Portugal, 1994). Owners are
excluded while calculating total number of employees. To account for the financial
stability of a firm, the study incorporates credit ratings of the firms. Credit rating can take
a values from 1 to 5, “1” = worst and “5” = best. These credit ratings are provided by
Dun & Bradstreet.
Further, the legal form of a firm is also controlled for. Approximately 36% of the firms
in 2004, and 34% in 2008, operate as sole proprietorships, and the rest of them are
established as limited liability companies, partnerships and corporations.
1.3.2.4 Entrepreneur-specific variables and controls
There is a detailed set of information on demographics of up to fourteen owners in
the Kauffman Firm Survey. “About 65% of the KFS firms had just one owner, while 26%
had two, and 9% had three or more owners in 2004” (Robb et al., 2008). In case of
multiple owners, rather than averaging their values, or averaging the weighted shares of
the business, the main owner of the firm is identified using a positive sorting. The main
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owner is estimated on the basis of who puts in the maximum work effort, a figure
calculated by using the number of hours each owner worked per week. In case there is a
tie on the number of hours worked, work experience is used to resolve that tie. Further
ties are resolved on the basis of maximum education and equity share. As a result of this
rank ordering, gender, age and ethnic origin of the main owner is clearly identifiable.
The general level of human capital is assessed on the basis of the main owner's
education and prior work experience. Owners were asked, “How many years of working
experience have you had in this industry - the one in which the business competes?” and
their responses ranged from 1 to 40+ (more than 40 years).
1.3.2.5 Industry-specific variables
The nature of the industry in which a firm operates also affects its ability to
innovate. Generally, high-technology companies are considered to infuse a higher
number, and a higher quality product as compared to non-high-tech firms. With
oversampled high-technology firms in the data, the firms are classified as “high-tech” and
“non-high-tech”, where hi-tech is a dummy variable, and takes the value “1” if a firm
belongs to the high-tech sector, or “0” otherwise. The classification is derived from
matching the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) with Heckler's
(2005) classification. For a firm to be called as a high-tech firm it should either be a
technology-employer10 or a technology-creator.

10

Two sets of criterion are used to define high-technology industry, (i) Following Chapple et al. (2004),
industries where employment exceeds three times the national averages of 3.33%, or 9.98% is labeled as
“technology-employer” and, (ii) Based on NSF’s Survey of Industrial Research and Development an
industry is termed as “technology-creator” if it exceeds the U.S. average for both research and development
expenditures for employee ($11,972) and the proportion of full-time-equivalent R&D scientists and
engineers in the industry workforce (5.9%).
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1.4

Empirical Estimation
1.4.1 Research design
On the basis of the above discussion, the count data on innovation that comprises

of number of patents and copyrights may be specified as follows:

I = f (β1w, β 2 x, β3 z),

(1)

Where, I is the level of innovation; β1, β2, β3 are the parameter vectors, and w is a set of
determinants of innovation related to policies that promote employee well-being; x
captures the leverage, and z is a set of standard variables used in the literature to explain
the innovative performance of firms. The operational model is:

yit = αwit + δzit + ηvit + λsi + θi + μit ,
i = 1,...,n

t = 1,...,5

(2)

where,

yit = is the level of innovation of firm i at time t
wit = index of employee well-being of firm i at time t
zit = debt-equity ratio of firm i at time t
vit = time varying characteristics at time t like age and experience
si = time invariant characteristics at time t like education, race, and gender
θi = unobserved individual effect (firm dynamics in nascent stages)
µit = residual
The firms in the data are in their initial years of existence, therefore, a small
number of patents and copyrights are generated. Approximately 80% of the firms have a
count of zero patents and copyrights. There are two options to evaluate a count model
with preponderance of zeros: the negative binomial regression, and the zero inflated
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negative binomial regression. Both the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) favored the negative binomial regression in this
study. A Hausman test is then conducted to test the efficiency of fixed over random
effects. To ascertain the impact of employee well-being on innovation, negative binomial
fixed effect estimator is used. The estimated standard errors have been adjusted for
heteroscedasticity. Further, to test the second linkage between firm's leverage and
employee well-being, firm specific fixed effects are used. It should be noted that only
those firms are included for analysis that made it to their fifth year. Therefore, the sample
consists of all the successful firms, which shows the presence of selection bias.
1.4.2 Empirical results
The study investigates the correlation between a firm's financial structure,
employee well-being, and innovation. It aims at explaining whether young firms actually
consider the debt-equity ratio and employee welfare while deciding their level of
innovation. Table 1.4 presents the estimation results of the first model exploring
innovation as the outcome.
The sample size is reduced to 1,151 observations because of preponderance of
zeros in the estimation model. Further, out of 1,151 observations, 943 observations are
for high-technology firms because the original sample is oversampled with hightechnology firms. A similar result is observed while calculating the effect of employee
well-being on firm leverage, where 1,725 observations out of a total of 2,464
observations are high-technology firms.
Table 1.4 shows that for all firms, as well as for high-technology firms, the
estimated coefficient of employee well-being is positive and statistically significant.
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Confirming the first linkage, the estimated model documents a positive effect of
employee well-being on innovation. To counter the argument that non-monetary benefits
act as a substitute for monetary payments, average wages paid by a firm are controlled in
the study. Even after controlling for wages, the coefficient of employee well-being is
positive and statistically significant. Results after controlling for wages are reported in
Table 1.5.
The coefficient on firm size, which is a sum total of full-time and part-time
employees is not significant. One argument could be that the majority of these firms have
no employees at all, and are operated by a single owner, thereby bringing down the effect
of size on innovation. In addition, the total asset base of the company has a significant
and positive effect on innovation. A large asset base gives the firm leverage to exploit its
resources, and deploy them for R&D activities.
Figure 1.7 Relation Between three variables using the KFS
Innovation

(+)

Employee Well-Being

(-)

No significant relation
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Leverage

Table 1.4 Results with Negative Binomial Fixed Effects Regression
Dependent Variable
VARIABLES

Innovation
(1)

(2)

All Firms

High-tech Firms

0.050***

0.042**

(0.019)

(0.021)

-0.309***

-0.258**

(0.109)

(0.118)

5.30e-0***

6.53e-0***

(1.86e-0)

(2.03e-0)

-0.001

-0.007

(0.008)

(0.008)

0.059

0.016

(0.068)

(0.074)

0.015

0.057

(0.056)

(0.061)

0.022**

0.014

(0.008)

(0.008)

-0.007

-0.010

(0.010)

(0.010)

Employee Well Being
Debt-Equity Ratio
Total Assets
Size
Intangible Assets
Credit Rating
Age of the Owner
Work Experience
Constant

-1.706***

Observations
Number of Firms

-1.356***

(0.405)

(0.437)

1,151

943

345

284

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5
and 10% level respectively

Generally, intangible assets are associated with a higher level of innovation.
However, in this study, no significant impact of intangible assets is found. Intangible
assets are constructed as a proportion of employees working in the area of R&D, scaled
by the total number of employees in the firm. Linking this result with the size of the firm,
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it can be inferred that the observations on total number of employees in general, and
R&D in particular are not sufficient to generate significant effect on innovation.
A word of caution while interpreting the results is that the direction of causation
may reverse from innovation to employee well-being. Studies have always taken human
resource practices and incentives as a causal variable. To justify the causality between
employee well-being and innovation in this case, a procedure used by Wyatt (2002) is
employed. To see in which direction the relationship runs between employee well-being
and innovation, two different correlations are compared: (i) Correlation A represents the
relationship between the 2004 employee well-being score and 2005 innovation level, and
(ii) Correlation B represents the relationship between 2004 innovation level and 2005
employee well-being score (see Table 1.6).
If higher innovation level is what generates a higher employee wellness,
Correlation B should be larger. In contrast, the way companies manage their human
capital is what drives the innovation, Correlation A should be larger. In this study, (i)
Correlation A (0.0681) is larger than (ii) Correlation B (0.0664). Although, the difference
is marginal, a higher correlation A shows the “temporal precedence” of employee wellbeing when compared with innovation. To explore the relation longitudinally, an
instrumental variable technique should be deployed. However, due to limitations in the
KFS, this technique cannot be used.
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Table 1.5 Results with Negative Binomial Fixed Effects Regression (After controlling for
wages)
Dependent Variable
VARIABLES

Innovation
(1)

(2)

All Firms

High-tech Firms

0.047**

0.041*

(0.020)

(0.022)

-0.317***

-0.253**

(0.110)

(0.120)

4.28e-0**

5.89e-0***

(1.96e-07)

(2.15e-07)

-0.003

-0.002

(0.008)

(0.009)

0.093

0.044

(0.069)

(0.075)

0.005

0.044

(0.056)

(0.062)

0.022**

0.013

(0.009)

(0.010)

-0.008

-0.011

(0.010)

(0.011)

-1.729***

-1.349***

(0.406)

(0.438)

1,136

930

344

283

Employee Well Being
Debt-Equity Ratio
Total Assets
Size
Intangible Assets
Credit Rating
Age of the Owner
Work Experience
Constant
Observations
Number of Firms

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5
and 10% level respectively

Table 1.6 Correlation between Employee Well-being & Innovation
Correlation A

2004 Employee Wellbeing * 2005 Innovation

0.068

Correlation B

2004 Innovation * 2005 Employee Wellbeing

0.066
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Further, exploring the second variable in the three tier linkage, my study reports a
negative impact of leverage on the level of innovation, a result that is contradictory to the
result documented by Smith (2010), using the Kauffman Firm Survey. In my study, debt
does not act as leverage in the debt-equity ratio. It is a known fact that with a moderate
amount of equity in the capital mix, debt acts as a leverage device, and investments with
external borrowings amplifies the firm's return to equity. A careful perusal of Figures 1.4,
1.5 and 1.6 shows that the level of total debt is varying over time and total equity shows a
declining trend. In this study, an increase in leverage is coming from the decline in
equity, and not from an increase in debt.
To have a full advantage of external borrowings, there should be a steady supply
of funds. One of the reasons for changing debt levels in the survey is the denial of loan
applications. Firms started with a mean debt level of $80,000 in 2004. However, of those
firms that applied for new credit, or renewed their existing credit in 2008, approximately
one-third had their applications denied. The most common reason cited for denial was
insufficient collateral and poor credit history (Robb et al., 2010). Despite the varying
level of debt, it remains the primary source of financing for all firms in this study (Brav,
2009; Heaton & Lucas, 2001).
The financial crisis in 2007 affected the owner’s confidence in the business. In
2008, owners were asked to report the effect of the financial meltdown on their
businesses. The KFS reports that, out of the surviving sample, only 21% of the firms said
they were unaffected by the financial crisis, while the remaining 40% reported somewhat
affected, and 39% of them reported they were affected to a great extent (see Table 1.7).
Owners were also asked to report the most challenging problem they faced in the past
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year, and almost 53% of the firms reported slow or lost sales (Robb et al., 2010).
Consequently, the two main components of equity, owner’s share of investment, and
equity from the non-owner operators declined.
Table 1.7 Effect of Recent Financial Problems on the Firms
Description

Percentage of Surviving Firms

A lot

39.0%

Some

40.0%

Not at all

21.0%

Source: KFS Microdata. Sample includes only surviving firms (2,606), Robb et al., (2010)

Analyzing the owner-specific variable, age of the owner positively affects the
level of innovation. However, the result is not significant for the high-technology firms.
One reason could be that high-technology industries are “new-age” industries, and an
entrepreneur's age might be relevant in case of managerial knowledge, and may not be a
determinant of technical knowledge.
Holmstrom (1989) suggests that firms that are concerned about their performance
and reputation will not undertake risky projects. An expected adverse impact on credit
ranking may motivate a firm to stay away from those projects that have higher levels of
risk involved. Undertaking projects with high uncertainty can have a negative impact on
innovation in the long run. However, in this sample, credit ratings do not explain the level
of innovation.
Further, the linkage between the debt-equity ratio and employee well-being is
analyzed using the fixed effects. Results are presented in Table 1.8 and report no
significant relation between leverage and employee well-being. Theory of reducing debt
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in order to save employees from bankruptcy cost is not valid in this study. Further, total
assets positively affect the leverage, whereas this result is not seen for high-technology
firms. A large asset base helps a company in taking more loans, because these assets can
act as collateral.
Table 1.8 Regression Results for Leverage with Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable
VARIABLES

Debt - Equity Ratio
(1)
All Firms

(2)
High-tech Firms

0.002
(0.003)

0.001
(0.004)

5.63e-0*
(3.03e-08)

3.18e-0
(3.64e-08)

Size

-0.003*
(0.002)

-0.005***
(0.002)

Intangible Assets

0.012
(0.015)

0.013
(0.018)

Credit Rating

-0.002
(0.008)

-0.007
(0.010)

Age of the Owner

0.031***
(0.004)

0.031***
(0.005)

Constant

-1.023***
(0.190)

-1.062***
(0.231)

Observations

6,587

4,577

R-squared

0.020

0.022

Number of Firms

2,464

1,725

Employee Well Being
Total Assets

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5
and 10% level respectively
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1.5

Conclusion
The present paper empirically examines the role of leverage and employee well-

being on firm's innovation. Results document a negative impact of leverage on
innovation. Changing levels of debt does not allow a firm to exploit the inherent benefits
of using debt as leverage in the capital-mix. Fixed cost of debt financing affects the
capital structure, which in turn generates a large impact in the variability of cash-flows to
the shareholders.
The sample in the study consists of young firms, and demand for funds is limited
by the capital constraints imposed by the lenders. These credit constraints lead to a
disrupted supply of funds. It should be noted that innovation involves research activities
that require a regular supply of funds. The current economic situation has led to a
decrease in owner’s equity, where owners are not willing to invest their own money into
the business. A steady decline in equity will lead to a situation where these firms will
become “all-debt” firms. In that scenario, leverage will lose its significance, and firms
will have to bear fixed obligations in the form of interest payments, which will make the
existing equity more risky. Use of debt allows a firm to enjoy the benefits from interest in
the form of tax shield. With declining levels of equity, the additional value of the interest
tax shield will be offset by an increase in the expected bankruptcy cost. This will further
increase the probability of bankruptcy, and expected costs associated with it.
The asymmetry of information between lenders and borrowers is the major cause
of capital constraints for young firms. It is interesting to observe that total debt for hightech firms showed a declining pattern only in the second year. This points towards the
need for more mature financial markets that are ready to lend to business start-ups.
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Smaller banks can play a role in having “relationship lending” to young firms who have
shown a good repayment track.
The study also presents a new perspective on human resource policies of the startups. Much of our knowledge on employee welfare activities is restricted to large and
established firms. The study highlights that, in addition to the financial structure, young
firms even care about the welfare of its employees. And this employee welfare reflects
positively on the level of innovation. In other words, it is not only the large firms that
formulate policies for employee well-being; even start-ups consider employee welfare as
a part of the corporate structure.
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Chapter 2: Speed of Entrepreneurial Learning and Firm Growth

2.1

Introduction
Researchers have shown that there is evidence of an entrepreneur learning the

tricks of the trade as time passes. Efficient entrepreneurs identify the opportunities
offered by the market, which gets reflected in the growth of the business. Therefore, it
becomes crucial to identify how fast an entrepreneur learns and adjusts his beliefs to the
new information and signals received from the environment, and if an entrepreneur learns
faster, does he generate better results for the business? If these newer beliefs do not bring
any advantage to the organization, then why should an entrepreneur update his opinion on
the basis of new signals? These questions are unraveled by building on the model of
entrepreneurial learning developed by Parker (2006). The present study investigates,
whether the speed of entrepreneurial learning is the same across time and across groups,
and whether the firm’s growth is altered by this learning. While the focus of the study is
on capturing the speed of learning, it also explores the linkages between learning, growth
and firm survival.
Parker (2006), using an adaptive expectations approach, finds that entrepreneurs
assign more weight to the prior beliefs, and provides evidence of differences in speed of
learning across groups. However, he treats the speed of learning as a constant, and
presents little evidence on how the speed of learning evolves with the age of the firm. In
contrast, the current study using a Bayesian framework presents theoretical evidence of a
decline in the speed of learning, which is also in consonance with the empirical findings.
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Parker seeks to determine the speed of entrepreneurial learning captured through a
change in effort level expended in the business. Using an adaptive expectations approach,
he builds a model of entrepreneurial learning where an entrepreneur supplies effort, and
forms an expectation of his effort's unobserved productivity for the next period. The
entrepreneur only receives noisy signals about the productivity, so learning takes time.
The reason for this is that outcomes associated with the effort are known to an
entrepreneur only at the end of the period. Therefore an entrepreneur can only form an
expectation about the productivity that his level of effort generates. The current effort and
expectation of unobserved productivity together gets translated into a firm's earnings.
Further, Parker's model suggests that an entrepreneur's future actions are derived
from the asymmetry between the expectations he formed in the previous period, and the
market signals he receives in the real time. If there is no divergence between the
expectations and the noisy signals, he maintains the status quo. However, if the
expectations formed exceed the signals, he will update his beliefs about the unobserved
productivity, and decrease the effort supplied in the next period. In contrast, if signals are
greater than the expectations, he will update the unobserved productivity in a way that
will increase the future work effort. The new effort level will further affect the earnings
in the next period. The continuous updating process in the light of new information
captures the speed with which an entrepreneur responds to the newer signals. Therefore,
future prospects depend on how effectively an entrepreneur processes new, volatile, and
costly signals that he receives from the environment (Casson, 2005). Levinthal (1996)
mentions that adaptive exchange with the environment changes the behavior of an
entrepreneur that further leads to “specialization” (p.26-27). The methodology of
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adaptive expectations even allows for arbitrary choices which are updated on the basis of
the signals an entrepreneur receives (Marcet & Nicolini, 2003; Milani, 2007; Politis,
2005).
Parker uses weekly hours expended into the business by an owner as a measure of
work effort. He uses a two year data from the British Household Panel Survey, and finds
that entrepreneurs adjust their beliefs by 16% when they receive new signals. He refers to
this process of adjusting beleifs as, “the extent to which entrepreneurs exploit new
information when updating their expectations” (p.7). In other words, entrepreneurs assign
lesser weight to the newer information, and more to his older beliefs. He finds that there
are no significant differences in the speed of learning between male and female
entrepreneurs, or between employers and non-employer firms. However, he reports that
younger entrepreneurs significantly assign a higher weight to the new signals as
compared to the older entrepreneurs.
Parker treats the speed of learning (which he captures through λ, see section 2 for
a detailed analysis) as a constant, which captures how an entrepreneur assigns weights
between the past beliefs and the new signals. In his analysis, there is little evidence of
how the speed of learning evolves over time. The weighing process, if analyzed over a
longer period of time, will reveal how the mix of weights between new and prior beliefs
evolve. To exactly capture this weighing trend empirically, six year confidential microdata provided by the KFS through the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) data
enclave is used for the analysis. Following the methodology specified by Parker, learning
speed is calculated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in repeated cross-sections. For a
six year data-set, five parameters depicting the speed are estimated. The study seeks to
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examine existence of a pattern between the weights over a period longer than two years.
A clear declining trend is witnessed over the six years of analysis, where entrepreneurs
assign lesser weight to the newer signals each year, and more to the prior beliefs.
The evidence in the study is in consonance with the set-up of Bayesian learning,
where it is known that the speed of learning declines with the age of the firm. There is
less information to extract from the noisy signals, which an entrepreneur receives as the
business gets older. Bayesian learning formulates learning in a framework where an
entrepreneur is not fully informed, and updates his beliefs using a Bayesian learning rule.
The initial beliefs in the Bayesian learning are termed as “prior,” which are revised
contingent on the events that yields an updated or modified uncertainty known as
“posterior.” The whole process is known as “updating a prior” because the posterior in
the current stage will act as a prior to the next stage (Albert, 2001, p.2). Linking the
concept of posterior and prior to the present study, there is clear evidence that the
posterior beliefs that an entrepreneur deciphers from an expectation of the unobserved
productivity carry less weight each year. The declining weight leads to a decline in the
speed of learning. So, as the firm gets older, less weight is assigned to the new
information, and it suggests a Bayesian model rather than the adaptive expectations
model written by Parker.
Further, it is not possible to test for the survivorship bias in Parker's study. It is
possible that firms that survive a longer period display a higher speed of learning. To
account for survivorship bias, the present study looks into two scenarios. In the first case,
accounting for firm attrition, speed of learning is calculated for those firms that survived
all six years. In the second case, the entire sample is considered. Pooled OLS estimator is
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used to calculate the differences in learning across the groups. Six categories are defined
on the basis of individual-, market- and industry-specific factors. These are: gender, age,
primary location of the business, whether the firm has employees, technology level, and
legal status. Cross-section of firms displays a similar result under both the scenarios
providing evidence for no survivorship bias.
One of the missing pieces from Parker's study is whether the speed of learning
alters the firm's performance. If an entrepreneur is quick in imbibing the signals, and acts
fast, it is of further interest to determine its impact on the firm's performance. Is there a
clear one-to-one mapping of higher speed of learning to superior firm performance? Or,
is the speed of learning just a response variable that only captures the volatility in the
work effort, and has no relation to the firm's growth. Therefore, to test for a relation
between the entrepreneurial speed of learning and the firm's growth, return on assets is
calculated for the firms that survived all six years, and is compared with the speed of
learning. The empirical results provide evidence of no clear linkage between the two
variables. Firms with higher speed of learning are not necessarily high growth, or better
performing firms.
The above result should be interpreted with caution because firms with slow
speed of learning are the firms which perform better in terms of growth and survival.
There is a clear linkage between survival rate and firm growth. Firms that survived the
entire six year period show a higher rate of return on assets. A longer spell is favorable
for the growth of the firms. The reason for this can be ascribed to the fact that, with the
age, firm productivity level improves (Irwin & Klenow, 1994). Better productivity gets
translated into a higher growth rate. There is research exploring the intricate relation
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between firm age, survival and growth. While some studies point towards the fact that the
relation between these factors vary across industries among start-ups (Dunne et al.,
1989), some ascribe this to the ability of a firm to adapt to the ever-changing business
environment (Geroski, 1995), and some have even pointed out that, “entrants that are able
to survive exhibit higher growth rates” (Audretsch, 1995, p.1). These results are
confirmed for the sample under consideration.
There are three implications from the above discussion. First, the speed of
learning declines with time. The noisy signals carry less weight, and each set of new
information is less important to the entrepreneur as compared to the old one. It should be
noted that the firms in this data-set are start-ups, and are in their sixth year of existence.
While there is more to learn in the initial years, the need to assign more weight to the
market signals goes down when a business is firmly established. The above-mentioned
fact is supported within the framework of Bayesian learning. An entrepreneur then relies
on his past behavior to steer him towards the path of success. The analysis has some
policy implications for the organizations that train and assist business start-ups. It is
advisable to guide and assist the start-ups in the initial years when entrepreneurs are open
to the concept of learning, and assign more weight to the market signals. Assistance in
the form of policy programs does affect the venture performance (Roper & Hart, 2005),
because an entrepreneur's past and current beliefs are not processed in isolation. There is
interdependency between these beliefs and actions that guide an entrepreneur, and builds
his future beliefs (Minniti & Bygrave, 2001).
Second, differentials in the speed of learning across groups do not suggest
superiority of one group over another. In the present study, there is clear evidence of a
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significantly higher speed of learning for firms operating from the rental location as
compared to the firms operating from home. Similarly, firms with employees, and firms
that are established as corporations have a higher speed of learning. However, this does
not imply that the firms with higher speed of learning are better than the comparison
groups. Considering two cases, (i) let us assume that firms operating from home and
rental spaces both share the same level of information to begin with, but firms in rental
spaces have access to more precise current market signals than firms operating from
home. It seems that firms in rental locations are better than the ones which operate from
the home. However, firms operating from rental offices learn faster because the new
information they receive is more precise, and they know more than the other group to
begin with; (ii) let us assume that if firms operating from rental locations knows less to
begin with, and both groups receive current market signals with the same precision, it can
be inferred that firms in the rental location are not good performers. They show a higher
speed of learning because they have more to learn in order to catch up to the level of
firms operating from home. Therefore, a higher speed of learning is not necessarily a
good thing. Even with a higher speed of learning, one group could be better or worse than
the other. To gain evidence of the result from Bayesian learning, further analysis in this
study explores the linkage between higher speed of learning, and firm growth that is
explained in the next point.
Third, empirical analysis suggests that a higher speed of learning does not alter a
firm's growth rate. It can be inferred that, even if an entrepreneur assigns more weight to
the noisy market signals, it does not mean that this will be reflected in the firm's
performance. It could be that each additional signal an entrepreneur receives is not worth
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the prior signal. This means that future signals are not as informative for the entrepreneur
in the later stages, and therefore, does not get translated into the performance of the
business. If group A shows a higher speed of learning as compared to group B, in this
framework it would mean that entrepreneurs in group A assign a higher weight to the
market signals as compared to group B. Furthermore, if growth rate for group B is greater
than group A, this would simply mean that the prior beliefs held by group B
entrepreneurs are more informative than the market signals that are received by group A.
The above perspective points towards the fact that the speed of learning tends to
decline with the age of the firm. However, this learning does not modify a firm's growth.
The decline in speed of learning should be interpreted with caution because assigning less
weight to the newer signals does not imply that there is no learning. In fact, an
entrepreneur with time learns to identify the relative worth of each signal, and assigns
weights accordingly. Assigning less weight is in consonance with the fact that firm's with
a slower speed of learning show a higher survival rate, and also a higher growth rate. Past
beliefs formed over this updating process serve as an important referral point, and these
beliefs are further reflected into higher survival and growth rate. Results are interpreted in
the light of Bayesian framework rather than adaptive expectations approach adopted by
Parker.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains Parker's
model of learning. Section 2.3 describes the data-set used for this study and how
variables are constructed. Section 2.4 presents the empirical estimation of speed of
learning across years and groups. It further presents evidence for results by interpreting
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them in light of Bayesian framework, followed by exploring the linkage between the
speed of learning and the firm’s growth. Section 2.5 presents the conclusion of the study.
2.2

Entrepreneurial learning
Accurate information on what affects a firm's performance and makes an

entrepreneur successful is important in formulating policy programs. Accurate
information is even more relevant in the case of business start-ups where it is tough to
survive the initial years, and even tougher to achieve a respectable growth rate. The initial
years of start-ups define future growth trajectory. An entrepreneur who can promptly
identify the market signals in the initial years will be better equipped to recognize the
opportunities, and deal with the macro-economic shocks. “Starting a new business is
essentially an experiment...which can be tested by experience” (Block & McMillan,
1985). The experimentation method leads to a process of learning and re-learning
(Petkova, 2009), which improves the entrepreneur's repertoire of ready references to be
used in the future when he faces similar situations. Therefore, history does matter
(Arthur, 1989), but to what extent will an entrepreneur be willing to rely on his past while
making current decisions? Factors that affect entrepreneurial learning are deemed
important, yet they are poorly understood, leaving us uninformed about its empirical
measurement. Using the adaptive expectations approach, Parker determines the speed of
learning by capturing the weighing process followed by an entrepreneur, which is
explained in the next sub-section.
2.2.1 Parker's model of entrepreneurial learning
Parker follows an adaptive expectations framework where an entrepreneur forms
an expectation that is based on his past experience. An updating process changes these
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expectations over a period of time, correcting for the systematic forecasting error. In
Parker’s study, an entrepreneur supplies the effort that is captured through hours worked
per week in the business, hit. Entrepreneur's ability, the market status, and a stochastic
component determine his productivity level. The stochastic component makes the true
productivity level indeterminable, which leaves an entrepreneur to form an expectation
about the “unobserved productivity” in the next period. It should be noted that the
earnings of the firm gets affected by this unobserved productivity via effort level supplied
by an entrepreneur. Therefore, it becomes important to form correct expectations that
help an owner to make apt judgments about the effort he is going to supply in the next
period. This updating process captures the speed with which an entrepreneur changes his
prior beliefs, and determines weight to be assigned to the noisy signals.
Considering the labor supply models, there is enough research in the area of hours
expended by the employees, and its impact on their productivity (Blundell & MaCurdy,
1999). The main issue in analyzing the work effort by the workers of a firm is to
determine the wage bill to be disbursed. In case of owners, effort exerted has a broader
impact not only on the firm’s current performance, but also on its future growth. In this
study, hours worked by an owner are used to construct an index of entrepreneurial
learning.
In Parker's model, an entrepreneur i, tries to maximize a linear utility function
Π ,
at time t :
Π

,

Π

(1)

,
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where, Π

,

is the weekly net operating profit, and cit is the non-pecuniary cost

of effort supplied by the entrepreneur, which takes the form of a Stone-Geary convex cost
function:
2

(2)

,

where, γ > 0, H ≥ 0 are both parameters, and entrepreneurs dislike working
beyond H . True unobserved productivity, pit, is defined as the ratio of output (current
revenue) to input (effort exerted in the last period, i.e. lag hours, hit-1). Combining the
signal of unobserved productivity and normalizing the output to one, productivity
becomes, pˆ it =

1
hit −1

, and signal for revenue can be extracted as, 1 = pˆ it .hit −1 . Pecuniary

operating costs take the form φit .hit −1 , where φ it is the marginal operating cost, and it
consists of two parts, an individual specific marginal cost, φi , and a stochastic
component, ε t . It is assumed that φi is known to an entrepreneur with certainty and

E(ε t ) = 0 . Therefore, operating profits are
̂ .

.

,

(3)

from which the signal, p̂it , can be obtained:
̂

(4)

.

To determine the effort to be exerted in the next period, an entrepreneur forms an
expectation of his true unobserved productivity, pit, that is based on the information set,
Ωit, available to him at time t, and the signals an entrepreneur receives for his future
unobserved productivity, pˆ it +1 , as described in equation (4). This yields,
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|
̂

|

.

(5)

The information set at time t, is the union of past information set available at time
t-1, and the productivity signal at time t. The entrepreneur continuously interacts with his
environment, and receives new signals about the effort he supplies. The interaction
process helps him in updating his beliefs, which in part comes from the new signals, and
in part from his prior beliefs. The updating process finally leads to learning about the true
state of nature, if λ > 0, leading to the following assumption:
|

|

|
̂

, 0

1

(6)

where, λ ∈ [0,1] in equation (6) is a parameter that captures the speed of learning,
or as Parker terms it, “the extent to which entrepreneurs exploit new information when
updating their expectations.” Generally, an entrepreneur's expectation of the unobserved
productivity in period t-1, E( pit −1 | Ωit −1 ) , and the signals that he receives from the
market for his unobserved productivity in period t, ̂ , will not be same. There is bound
to be a difference between the two which is captured by
In equation (6), if

in equation (6).

0, then (6) reduces to E( pit | Ωit = E( pit −1 | Ωit −1 ) , which

implies that the entrepreneur assigns all weight to his prior beliefs, and does not learn
from the noisy market signals. If λ=1, then (6) reduces to E( pit | Ωit ) = pˆ it , which implies
that the entrepreneur assigns all weight to the noisy market signals. In this updating
process, one can get intermediate values of , which implies that an entrepreneur tries to
create a mix between noisy signals, and the prior beliefs. The new expectation of true
unobserved productivity from (6) further guides an entrepreneur to decide on his effort
level to be supplied in the next period. If his expectation of returns in the form of
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earnings has increased, he will exert more effort in period t+1. The effort level that
maximizes expected net revenue can be calculated as:
|

,

(7)

As γ > 0, there is a positive relation between the expected productivity and effort.
Substituting the values of E( pit | Ωit ) in the above equation generates the regression
equation from which we can estimate λ:
1

.

(8)

In equation (8), hit is the hours worked in period t, α = λ H and is a positive
constant,

Πit
is the profit to lagged hours ratio, and µit is an error term with mean
hit −1

zero.
Following Parker, equation (8) is estimated in the repeated cross-sections for the
entire sample, and then a group wise analysis is conducted where lag hours and profit to
lag hour ratio is interacted with a dummy variable. This dummy variable indicates
membership of specific firm into the group or otherwise. The next section describes the
data and how the variables are constructed.
2.3

Sample Description
2.3.1 Data-set
The study uses a confidential micro-dataset provided by the KFS through the

NORC data enclave. To only include permanent failure, 2,082 firms are taken out from
the sample because (i) they temporarily went out of business, (ii) of non-response/refusal,
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(iii) they were merged with another business or sold, or (iv) they had missing data on
owners and revenue. The final sample size used in this study consists of 3,061 firms11.
2.3.2 Variable construction
Effort exerted by an entrepreneur is defined as, hit, hours worked per week at the
business. To calculate the weekly net operating profit, Πit , annual net operating profit
reported in the survey is divided by fifty two. To calculate the differences in learning
between groups, six groups are defined on the basis of individual-, market- and industryspecific factors. These are: gender, age, primary location of business, whether the firm
has employees, technology level, and legal status. Table 2.1 gives a detailed description
of the groups.
2.3.2.1 Owner-specific categorization
Learning differentials are recorded for male and female entrepreneurs with the
help of first categorization. In the baseline survey of 2004, approximately 69% of the
firms have male owners, and the same trend is recorded in 2008 (68%). However, in the
constructed sample, firms with male entrepreneurs have a slightly higher survival rate.
Similarly, one of the important facets that affect the speed of learning is the age of
an entrepreneur. With a modal age of 41, entrepreneurs older than 41 are categorized as
“older” and if the age is less than 41, they are categorized as “younger.” In the case of
older entrepreneurs, past behavior can act as a ready reference, whereas in the case of
younger entrepreneurs where there is a lack of ready set of references, it is more likely
that they will assign a higher weight to the current market signals. Therefore, it is

11

For details on survey construction, see Chapter 1, section1.3.2.4

46

interesting to measure the differences in the learning parameter for younger and older
entrepreneurs.
Table 2.1 Description of Sub-Groups
Sub-group

Categorization

Description

Female=1
Male=0

Female being the reference group

Older=1
Younger=0

Age > 41: Older (modal age)

Owner Specific
Gender of the Owner
Age of the Owner
Firm Specific
Employer

Employer=1
Non Employer=0

Location of business

Home-Based=1
Rented=2
Other- Location=3

Legal status

Sole-Proprietor=1
Corporation=2
Other Legal=3

Defines Legal status of the firm

Hi-tech=1
Med-tech=2
Low-tech=3

Firm belongs to which Industry

Firm is an employer or not

Describes location of the business
space

Industry Specific
Technology Level

2.3.2.2 Firm specific categorization
It is also interesting to observe the linkage between the location of primary
businesses and hours expended. If an entrepreneur can operate from home, one can argue
that he may put in less number of hours. In 2004, approximately 50% of the firms were
home-located businesses. The number declined to 48.9% in 2007, after some
entrepreneurs moved their businesses from residential houses to a rented place or other
location. The motivation of expanding the business and/or moving closer to customers
could be guiding this move.
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Another interesting feature is whether a firm's “employer status” changes the way
an entrepreneur reacts to the market signals. Similarly, the legal status of the firm might
generate differences in the way entrepreneurs assign the weights to the prior beliefs and
market signals. One of the reasons for the difference could be that firms established as
corporations face a lot more legal obligations as compared to the firms operating as sole
proprietorship, making them more alert about the rules and regulations, thereby assigning
a higher weight on the market signals.
2.3.2.3 Industry specific categorization
The nature of the industry in which a firm operates also affects an entrepreneur's
ability to learn. Generally, high-technology companies are considered to infuse more
number of new technologies and products into the market, as compared to non-hightechnology sector firms. In other words, one can infer that entrepreneurs of hightechnology firms react faster than non-high technology firm entrepreneurs. However, one
can also argue that firms that are not technology-oriented have a lot more to learn
regarding the market, and update their level of technology. With oversampled hightechnology firms in the data, industries have been classified as high-, medium-, lowtechnology industries. The next section explains the empirical results across years and
groups.
2.4

Empirical Estimation
2.4.1 Estimation across years
Equation (8) is estimated using OLS in repeated cross-sections that generates five

values of λ, where each value is based on changes in hours worked over two contiguous
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years. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 shows the path of two λs, one for surviving firms, and another
one for the entire sample of firms. It is evident that λ follows a downward trend in both
the cases, and there are minor differences between the paths of λ for the two groups. It is
inferred that over a period of time the speed of learning tends to decline. The value of λ
for the entire sample as shown in Figure 2.1 starts from 29.8% in the base year, and then
declines to 25.2% in the second year; in the third and fourth years it decreases to 18.8%
and 17.5%, and has a value of 16.7% in the final year (see Table 2.2 (a, b, c)).
Recognizing the survey nature of the data, survey commands have been used for the
analysis, and therefore all the tables report linearized standard errors.

Figure 2.1 Speed of Learning for the Entire Sample
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Figure 2.2 Speed of Learning for the Surviving Firms

Table 2.2 (a) All firms: OLS – Pooled and Owner Specific
Groups

04-05

05-06

06-07

07-08

08-09

Significant
within groups
across years

Pooled

0.29***
(0.01)

0.25***
(0.01)

0.18***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.01)

-

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.68

Owner Specific
Female

0.23***
(0.03)

0.23***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.03)

0.19***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.02)

Male

0.31***
(0.02)

0.25***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.68

Older

0.29***
(0.02)

0.23***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.15***
(0.01)

Younger

0.32***
(0.03)

0.28***
(0.02)

0.20***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)

0.19***
(0.02)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.68

N

1508

3061

2938

2719

2585

No

No

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test. Significance of lambda across years is
tested using an Adjusted Wald test. * p < .10,** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.2 (b) All firms: OLS – Firm Specific
Groups

04-05

05-06

06-07

07-08

08-09

Significant within
groups across years

Home Based

0.25***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.01)

0.18***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.01)

Yes ***

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.69

Rented

0.46***
(0.03)

0.37***
(0.02)

0.25***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.03)

R2

0.58

0.62

0.66

0.67

0.69

Other
Location

0.22***
(0.04)

0.23***
(0.03)

0.21***
(0.03)

0.19***
(0.03)

0.18***
(0.02)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.68

Employer

0.34***
(0.02)

0.29***
(0.01)

0.21***
(0.01)

0.21***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.02)

Non
Employer

0.24***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.01)

0.15***
(0.01)

R2

0.58

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.69

0.26***
(0.02)

0.24***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.03)

0.17***
(0.03)

0.20***
(0.02)

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.69

0.43***
(0.04)

0.34***
(0.03)

0.25***
(0.03)

0.23***
(0.03)

0.18***
(0.02)

R2

0.58

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.69

Other Legal

0.25***
(0.02)

0.21***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.02)

0.15***
(0.02)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.69

N

1508

3061

2938

2719

2585

Sole
Proprietor
R2
Corporation

Yes***

No

Yes***

No

Yes***

No

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test. Significance of lambda across years is
tested using an Adjusted Wald test.* p < .10,** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.2 (c) All firms: OLS – Industry Specific
Groups

04-05

05-06

06-07

07-08

08-09

Significant within
groups across years

Hi-tech

0.27***
(0.04)

0.26***
(0.03)

0.23***
(0.03)

0.18***
(0.03)

0.15***
(0.03)

No

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.68

Med-tech

0.28***
(0.03)

0.24***
(0.02)

0.21***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)

0.14***
(0.01)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.68

Low-tech

0.31***
(0.02)

0.25***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.18***
(0.01)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.68

N

1508

3061

2938

2719

2585

No

No

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test. Significance of lambda across years is
tested using an Adjusted Wald test.* p < .10,** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Figure 2.3 Comparison Based on Groups12

12

Lambda, the speed of learning is captured on Y-axis, and Years are represented on X-axis.
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Table 2.3 (a) Surviving firms: OLS – Pooled and Owner Specific
Groups

04-05

05-06

06-07

07-08

08-09

Pooled

0.30***
(0.02)

0.25***
(0.01)

0.18***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.01)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

Significant within
groups across years
-

Owner Specific
Female

0.24***
(0.03)

0.24***
(0.03)

0.23***
(0.03)

0.18***
(0.03)

0.14***
(0.02)

Male

0.31***
(0.02)

0.25***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.17***
(0.01)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.69

Older

0.30***
(0.02)

0.24***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.01)

0.14***
(0.01)

Younger

0.31***
(0.03)

0.27***
(0.02)

0.21***
(0.02)

0.19***
(0.02)

0.19***
(0.02)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

N

1295

2661

2617

2448

2432

No

No

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test. Significance of lambda across years is
tested using an Adjusted Wald test.* p < .10,** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.3 (b) Surviving firms: OLS – Firm Specific
Groups

04-05

05-06

06-07

07-08

08-09

Home
Based

0.25***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.02)

0.17***
(0.02)

0.17***
(0.01)

0.15***
(0.01)

0.57

0.62

0.67

0.68

0.68

0.44***
(0.03)

0.36***
(0.02)

0.23***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)

0.21***
(0.03)

R2

0.58

0.62

0.67

0.68

0.68

Other
Location

0.22***
(0.05)

0.23***
(0.03)

0.20***
(0.03)

0.19***
(0.03)

0.19***
(0.03)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

Employer

0.36***
(0.02)

0.29***
(0.01)

0.20***
(0.01)

0.19***
(0.02)

0.21***
(0.02)

Non
Employer

0.23***
(0.03)

0.22***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.02)

0.15***
(0.01)

R2

0.58

0.62

0.67

0.68

0.69

Sole
Proprietor

0.26***
(0.30)

0.24***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)

0.16***
(0.02)

0.19***
(0.02)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

Corporation

0.42***
(0.04)

0.33***
(0.03)

0.25***
(0.02)

0.22***
(0.03)

0.17***
(0.02)

R2

0.58

0.61

0.66

0.67

0.69

Other Legal

0.25***
(0.03)

0.22***
(0.02)

0.15***
(0.02)

0.15***
(0.02)

0.14***
(0.01)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

N

1295

2661

2617

2448

2432

R2
Rented

Significant within
groups across years
Yes ***

Yes***

Yes***

Yes***

No

Yes***

No

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test. Significance of lambda across years is
tested using an Adjusted Wald test.* p < .10,** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.3 (c) Surviving firms: OLS – Industry Specific
Groups

04-05

05-06

06-07

07-08

08-09

Hi-tech

0.30***
(0.05)

0.30***
(0.04)

0.26***
(0.03)

0.17***
(0.03)

0.13***
(0.03)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

Med-tech

0.26***
(0.03)

0.22***
(0.02)

0.21***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.02)

0.14***
(0.02)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

Low-tech

0.32***
(0.02)

0.25***
(0.01)

0.15***
(0.01)

0.16***
(0.01)

0.18***
(0.01)

R2

0.57

0.61

0.67

0.68

0.68

N

1295

2661

2617

2448

2432

Significant within
groups across years
No

No

Yes***

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test. Significance of lambda across years is
tested using an Adjusted Wald test.* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

It is interesting to observe that Parker estimated λ to be 16% from a single crosssection and firms with differing ages, suggesting that there is a little impact of newer
information on entrepreneurs. In the initial years of a firm's existence, there is a plethora
of new information to be absorbed and assimilated by an entrepreneur that yields the
maximum learning. As time elapses and an entrepreneur is fine tuned to the demands and
expectations of the business, additional learning tends to decline. Therefore, beliefs that
affect the learning process may either lose or gain their influence over time (Bullard &
Duffy, 1994; Dawid, 1999; Minniti & Bygrave, 2001).
Table 2.2 (a, b, c) gives a detail account of variation in λ over six years for the
entire sample, and Table 2.3 (a, b, c) lists the values of λ for the firms which survived six
years. These results are presented over owner-, firm- and industry-specific groups, and
the same declining trend is observed (also see Figure 2.3). The value of λ is significant at
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1% level in each year. Further λs are tested for significance across years using a Wald test
and found to be significant.
Table 2.2 (a, b, c) and 2.3 (a, b, c) provide the year-specific results. To analyze
how different groups react to the market signals and alter their speed of learning, a pooled
OLS estimator is calculated by estimating equation (8). The values of λ from the pooled
OLS estimator for groups lie in the same range as for the year-specific case. The results
are tested for significance using an adjusted Wald test. Table 2.4 (a, b, c) shows that the
same results are obtained when the survivor bias is not corrected, and the results are
calculated over groups for surviving firms, and when survivor bias is considered and
overall sample is considered into the analysis. There is no evidence of a difference in
learning rates. These results are discussed in the next section.

57

Table 2.4 (a) Comparison of surviving firms and entire sample using Pooled OLS Estimator

Groups

Surviving
Firms: λ

Pooled

0.20***
(0.01)

R2

Significance
across
groups

All
firms:
λ

Significance
across
groups

-

0.21***
(0.01)

-

0.65

0.65
Owner Specific

Female

0.21***
(0.02)

0.29***
(0.03)

Male

0.20***
(0.01)

R2

0.65

0.65

Older

0.20***
(0.01)

0.20***
(0.01)

Younger

0.21***
(0.02)

R2

0.65

0.65

N

7835

9474

No

No

0.21***
(0.01)

0.21***
(0.02)

No

No

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test.
Significance of lambda across groups is tested using an Adjusted Wald test.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.4 (b) Comparison of surviving firms and entire sample using Pooled OLS Estimator
Firm Specific
Groups

Surviving
Firms: λ

Home
Based

0.18***
(0.01)

R2
Rented

Significance
across
groups

All
firms:
λ

Significance
across
groups

Yes *

0.18***
(0.01)

Yes *

0.65
0.28***
(0.02)

0.65
Yes*

0.28***
(0.02)

R2

0.65

Other
Location

0.20***
(0.02)

R2

0.65

0.65

Employer

0.25***
(0.01)

0.25***
(0.01)

Non
Employer

0.18***
(0.01)

R2

0.65

Sole
Proprietor

0.20***
(0.01)

R2

0.65

Corporation

0.30***
(0.02)

R2

0.65

Other Legal

0.16***
(0.01)

Yes*

0.65
No

Yes**

0.21***
(0.02)

0.18***
(0.01)

No

Yes**

0.65
No

0.20***
(0.01)

No

0.65
Yes***

0.29***
(0.02)

Yes***

0.65
Yes*

0.17***
(0.01)

R2

0.65

0.65

N

7835

9474

Yes *

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test.
Significance of lambda across groups is tested using an Adjusted Wald test.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.4 (c) Comparison of surviving firms and entire sample using Pooled OLS Estimator
Industry- Specific
Groups

Surviving
Firms: λ

Hi-tech

0.20***
(0.02)

R2

0.65

Med-tech

0.20***
(0.01)

R2

0.65

Low-tech

0.20***
(0.01)

Significance
across
groups

All
firms:
λ

Significance
across
groups

No

0.19***
(0.02)

No

0.65
No

0.20***
(0.01)

No

0.65
No

0.21***
(0.01)

R2

0.65

0.65

N

7835

9474

No

Significance of lambda for each group is tested using a Wald Test.
Significance of lambda across groups is tested using an Adjusted Wald test.
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

2.4.2 Estimation across groups
Except for the firm-specific categorization, none of the groups show an evidence
of significant differences in learning rates between groups. Considering the firm-specific
categorization, businesses located in the rented space, firms which have employees
working in it, and firms established as corporations, show a higher speed of learning as
compared to their counterparts. A home office as the primary business location with no
employees adds flexibility to the working schedule of an entrepreneur that might make
him complacent. In addition, home-based businesses are established as sole
proprietorships. In this study, 21% of the firms are established as sole proprietorships and
are located in the home, as compared to only 11% of the firms established as
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corporations. Having employees as a support system, and established as a corporation
makes an entrepreneur more active that makes him assign a higher weight to the market
signals. There is evidence that the choice of legal status with which a firm is established
speaks a lot about the long term goals of the owner (Frankish et al. 2007), where firms
established as corporations have higher growth targets. The reason for this could be that
hiring people and working as a corporation generates an expectation that entrepreneurs
should at least be familiar with labor and corporate laws. To illustrate, if a firm operates
as a corporation which produces chemicals, then providing a safe working environment
to his employees is a legal requirement. Being a corporation exerts an extra pressure on
the owner that is reflected in assigning a higher weight to the current market signals.
Considering the owner-specific sub-group, the speed of learning is higher for
younger entrepreneurs; however, the results are not significant. An older entrepreneur
would probably have a repertoire of references that he gained from his past beliefs and/or
experiences, making him less amenable to the current market signals. In contrast, when it
comes to the entrepreneurs who are young and at the same time new in business, they
would assign more weight on the market signals, thereby leaving them with a higher
speed of learning.
Analyzing the results over the gender differentials yield mixed results. For the
surviving firms, female entrepreneurs show a higher speed of learning as compared to
male entrepreneurs, whereas for the entire sample male entrepreneurs show a higher
speed of learning. Despite the fact that firms with male entrepreneurs have a higher
survival rate (86%) as compared to women entrepreneurs (82%), firms which survive all
six years show a higher female entrepreneur speed of learning. In other words, women
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learn over a period of time, and for the successful firms that survived the first six years,
women assign a higher weight to the market signals as compared to men.
Further, firms operating in low-tech industries generate a higher speed of
learning. One of the reasons for the speed of learning to be lower in the high-technology
industry is cited by Baloff (1971). He suggests that there are two stages of learning: in the
initial phase a firm begins the manufacturing process, and reaches a point when there is
no further learning that leads to “plateauing in the learning curve”. Yelle (1979) mentions
that firms which are more “machine-intensive” have a higher ratio of machine to total
labor, and a lower progress ratio. Moreover, Klenow (1998) in his research on learningby-doing mentions that, “the more production experience the firm has with a technology,
the less it has left to learn”. Therefore, in this study scope to learn explains a higher speed
of learning for firms in low-tech industries.
To check for robustness of results, a variation in the utility and a cost function
with a non-linear functional form is tested for. It should be noted that the same
methodology is followed to test for non-linearity in the utility function as adopted by
Parker. Up to six powers of Taylor approximation is tested for, and there is no evidence
of non-linearity even in this data-set, and the linear functional form is a robust
specification. Starting with j=2, 3...5, the coefficients are not significantly different from
zero.
The above mentioned analysis displays a declining speed of learning. However, the
adaptive expectations model presented by Parker treats λ to be a constant that does not
conform to the above result. The next section provides evidence using a Bayesian
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learning framework and proves that λ is not constant; rather it declines with the age of the
firm.
2.4.3 Interpretation of results using Bayesian framework
Interpreting the results in light of Bayesian framework, consider equation (7),
which shows the effort level that maximizes the expected net revenue. Let ̅ denote the
expected value of

at time t, i.e.,

̅

|

. Equation (7) can be rewritten as:

.

(9)

Equation (5) and (9) yield the following profit equation for an entrepreneur i:
̅

̅

,

(10)

If φi is known to an entrepreneur with certainty, then he would immediately learn
the true productivity, p. However, as there is noise associated with the marginal operating
2
cost of effort, an entrepreneur can only observe a signal, z t = p + ε t , where var(ε ) = σ .

Suppose that, i's prior belief about the true productivity, p, is that it is a draw from a
Normal distribution with mean θ and variance σ θ2 ; and that the signals, z, about p are
random draws from a Normal distribution with mean p and variance σ 2 . Let ̅ denote
the mean of the t signals observed up to period t. Using standard formulae for the normal
conjugate family (DeGroot, 1970, p.166), i's posterior belief is Normal with mean:
̅

θ

̅

(11)

,

and variance
(12)

.
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̅ ,

The variance of beliefs is a deterministic function of time; the pair

is a

sufficient statistic for current beliefs. The evolution of beliefs over time can be described
, ̅,

by a transition function,

that maps a Normal distribution, with mean ̅ and

variance σ t2 (Easley & Kiefer, 1988: 1050), into a Normal distribution with mean:
̅
̅

(13)

,

and variance
(14)

.
| ̅

It should be noted that

̅ which implies that

̅

| ̅

̅ in

equation (13). Equation (12) and (13) together yield the conditional variance of the
subjective mean as

̅

| ̅

1

(15)

,

The variance of ̅ declines as experience progresses at the rate
optimal amount of effort is linear in t, variance of

. As the

also declines at the rate

.

Therefore a simple Bayesian model predicts a declining variability in hours worked. To
see it more precisely, rewriting equation (13) and substituting the value of

from (12)

gives

̅

̅

(16)

,
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̅
̅

1

1

(17)

.

The above expression explains that as the firm gets older (i.e., as t gets larger),
less weight is put on the new information, and it suggests a Bayesian model rather than
the adaptive expectations model written by Parker. Parker's framework would say beliefs
take the form of an adaptive expectations rule and are like:
̅

1

̅

.

(18)

Comparing equation (18) with the Bayesian framework in equation (17), it is
interpreted that λ is not constant. Instead, (18) can be rewritten as:
̅

1

̅

.

(19)

Combining equation (17) and (19), after backdating them by one period gives an
equation for , which is strictly decreasing in t.
(20)

.

Therefore, the speed of learning is declining with the age of the firm. Interpreting
the different rates of λ across at any given point in time, consider two groups, A and B.
Assuming that group A has a higher estimated λ than group B, it can be good or bad news
for group A. Consider two scenarios:
•

If Group A has a higher variance for prior beliefs,
the current signals,

, but the same variance for

, this implies that group A has no more precise signals than

group B, but it knows less to start with. One supposes less precise signals are bad
for group A. It only appears to learn faster because it initially knows less, and
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therefore has more to learn. But group A is always inferior to group B because it
always knows less. Linking it with the empirical findings, younger entrepreneur,
and entrepreneurs operating in low-tech industries know less to start with,
resulting in a higher speed of learning. They are similar to group A in the
example.
•

If Group A has the same variance for prior beliefs, σ θ2 , but a lower variance for
the current signals, σ 2 , this implies that group A has more precise signals than
group B, but it initially knows exactly the same. One supposes more precise
signals are good for group A. It learns faster because its new information is more
precise. Group A always knows more than B, in this case.
It can be inferred that a higher λ is not necessarily a good thing. Even with a

higher λ, one group could be better or worse than the other. Further, to gain evidence of
the result from the Bayesian learning, the next section analyzes whether there is a relation
between λ and firm growth. In other words, it examines whether a higher λ is reflected in
the firm's performance.
2.4.4 Linkage with firm growth
To maintain uniformity, the same cross-section of firms is used for measuring the
firm growth as for the speed of learning. Relative growth percentage (2004 as the base
year and 2009 as the final year) for each group is calculated rather than calculating the
average growth rate over six years.
Growth rate is calculated only for surviving firms, for the reason that these firms
survived the initial hiccups which transpire with the “liability of newness” and “liability
of smallness” (Gilbert et al., 2006). Researchers have mentioned that firms which survive
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the whole period should be considered for accurate analysis. To illustrate, Hart & Prais
(1956) while analyzing business concentration highlighted that firms that are alive until
the end of the analysis will have an undue effect on the analysis if considered along with
the firms that exit the sample set midway. Audretsch et al. (2004), mention that growth
pattern should be analyzed only for firms that do not exit the market, and stay in business.
In this context, Petrunia (2008) aptly remarks that, “it is difficult to know what growth
persistence means for firms that exit an industry. Death is an absorbing state so growth
persistence is meaningless for exiting firms.” Moreover the initial super high, or low
growth rates will not have any influence on the calculation of growth rates. It should be
noted that there is no attempt to measure the determinants of growth in this study. The
focus is on ascertaining the differentials in the growth rates over the cross-section of
firms.
There is no unanimity on what constitutes growth of a firm which makes it even
more crucial to specify the methodology used to measure it (Diambeidou et al., 2007;
Korunka et al., 2011). Where increase in total assets might sound like a viable option to
measure growth for a firm involved in construction and manufacturing, it would be the
least preferable variable to capture growth for a firm involved in the services sector (see
Dobbs & Hamilton, 2006). Researchers have used various measures to account for firm
growth which range from increase in tangibles like total assets, sales and employees to
intangibles like profit, return on assets employed and revenue (Delmar, 1997; Davidsson
et al., 2006; Garnsey et al., 2006; Gilbert et al., 2006).
For this analysis, return on asset (ROA) is calculated to represent the firm growth
rate as shown in equation (21). It measures the return per dollar over total assets that
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constitute a sum total of borrowed money and owner's equity. It accounts for the
efficiency of the firm in addition to the profitability of the firm.
Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Earnings / Total Assets
Let

(21)

represent the return on asset of ith firm, belonging to a group k at time

t, where i ∈ Firms which survived six years , and
ROA between t=6 and t=1 gives an absolute growth
relative growth rate

∈ 1, … ,6 . The difference in
as shown in equation (22) and

shown in equation (23).
,

(22)
(23)

.

Return on asset gives a comprehensive view that captures debt, equity and profit
all in one. Analyzing the growth rate for the surviving firms, it is only for firm-specific
categorization of employer firms that generate a higher speed of learning, and a higher
growth rate (see Table 2.5). Except for this group, every other classification displays no
relation between the speed of learning and firm growth.
However, there is clear evidence that firms with higher growth rate are the firms
that survived more. To illustrate, owner-specific categories, men and older entrepreneurs
show a higher growth rate and a higher survival rate, despite the fact that both these
categorizations show a lower speed of learning. A similar result is observed for firms that
are in medium technology industries. It should be noted that longer surviving firms have
a higher rate of growth because, irrespective of learning, productivity rises with the firm's
age (Irwin & Klenow, 1994). Therefore, the above analysis strengthens the result
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obtained earlier that there is no reason to expect λ to be related to performance in one
direction over another.
Table 2.5 Comparison of learning speed, growth rate & rate of survival: Surviving firms

Speed of
learning: λ

Growth rate:
Return on
Asset

Female

0.21

2.64

Male

0.20

9.23

Older

0.20

7.99

Younger

0.21

7.15

Home Based

0.18

4.06

Rented

0.28

11.83

Other Location

0.20

12.13

Employer

0.25

7.99

Non Employer

0.18

7.33

Sole Proprietor

0.20

5.39

Corporation

0.30

8.44

Other Legal

0.16

9.69

Hi-tech

0.20

0.48

Med-tech

0.20

10.38

Low-tech

0.20

7.59

Groups

Speed of
learning
higher for
which group?

Return on
asset higher
for which
group?

Survival
rate higher
for which
group?

Female

Male

Male

Younger

Older

Older

Rented***

Other Location

Other Location

Employer **

Employer

Employer

Corporation***

Corporation

Other Legal

Low-tech

Med-tech

Med-tech

Owner Specific

Firm-Specific

Industry-Specific

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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2.5

Conclusion
One of the consistent and significant results from the above analysis is that speed

of learning declines with the age of the firm. The decline in speed of learning is
consistent with the framework of Bayesian learning where λ is not treated as constant;
rather it is determined from the mix of prior beliefs and current signals. Parker's
framework is based on adaptive expectations that treats λ as a constant, and presents little
evidence on the declining speed of learning.
Further, it is inferred that a higher speed of entrepreneurial learning is not
desirable, and there is no reason to expect a positive relation between entrepreneurial
leaning and firm growth in this framework. Instead, firm survival and growth rate are
positively related. The result holds even after firm attrition has been taken into
consideration. Even though there is no linkage between faster speed of learning and firm
growth, policy intervention in the form of assistance to start-ups in the initial years seems
a plausible method to detect the under-performers. Capturing learning, in its true sense, is
contingent on the correct estimates of signals an entrepreneur receives and his initial
knowledge. Cassar and Craig (2009) mention that entrepreneurs who rely more on their
past beliefs suffer from “hindsight bias” that affects their ability to make accurate
decisions (p.150). It is likely that there are bound to be distortions and errors even while
recalling the past information, which is thought to be more of a characteristic feature
while decoding the current noisy market signals. Therefore, there is presence of an error
component in both: forward looking approach of relying on current signals and backward
looking framework of recalling past information from already established beliefs. The
fact that how an entrepreneur extracts relevant information from each extra signal, and
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maintains a balance between past beliefs and current signals, captures his speed of
learning.
Moreover, looking at the results intuitively, why would an entrepreneur assign
increasing weights to the newer noisy market signals when he has already learned to
extract the relevant information from past beliefs? If weights for newer signals increase,
this implies there is no permanent learning, with no formation of beliefs that could have
served as a ready reference for the future. The structure of learning is reflected in the
higher survival rate along with the firm's better performance. Identifying the worth of
each new signal differentiates the true learning parameters of the entrepreneurs. As
Casson (1982) aptly pointed out that an entrepreneur “learns from the deals that he
makes, and he learns from the deals that fall through” (p 386). Therefore, in the first
place, each owner receives a different set of signals from the market that differentiates
their behavior and actions. Even though entrepreneurs somehow receive the same
information set, the processing and assimilating speed differs between them, which
differentiate the successful entrepreneurs from non-successful entrepreneurs (Frankish et
al., 2007).
To conclude, true learning enables formation of correct estimates and segregation
of good from bad signals. Assigning less weight to the new signals does not imply that an
entrepreneur is not learning. Past beliefs could be equally informative if the posterior
belief was updated correctly in the light of new information.
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Chapter 3: Diversification and Survival by Business Start-ups
3.1

Introduction
Despite the fact that growth and survival of small firms have been explored in

detail, diversification as one of the strategies for growth has not received the attention it
deserves. As a result, studies that explore diversification activities by small firms have
examined conventional research questions like, do small firms see diversification as a
growth strategy, and is there a positive association between diversification and
performance? If yes, then, is the relation linear or curvilinear (Auerswald, 2008; Baptista
et al., 2010; Doving & Gooderham, 2008; Giarratana, 2004; Kim & Kogut, 1996; Lynn,
1998; Lynn & Reinsch, 1990; Sandvig, 2000)?
These studies show that small firms see diversification as one of the strategies for
growth. However, they do not explore at what stage of the business an entrepreneur
decides to add new products or enter into new areas. One of the questions that an
entrepreneur of a young firm faces is: “When to diversify”? Expansion of the product
portfolio and geographical areas is one of the key factors that affect a firm's survival and
growth, and equally important is the timing of such an expansion.
However, due to data limitations, it is hard to identify when a business start-up
diversifies, and whether diversification is related to the business or an unrelated one. This
paper seeks answers to the following questions for business start-ups: (i) at what stage a
business start-up diversifies; (ii) is there an association between timing of diversification
and survival? In other words, whether diversifying at an early stage affects the survival
rate; and (iii) how long the effect of early diversification lasts, or does positive effect of
diversification show any persistence?
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A seven year (2004-2010) confidential micro-data provided by the KFS through
the NORC data enclave is used in this essay. To test for the timing and persistence of
diversification by start-ups, this study uses a Cox Proportional Hazard Model. The
empirical results in this study provide evidence that the majority of firms diversify in the
first year. Also, the firms diversifying at an early stage in their lives show a higher
survival rate. Further, the effect of adopting an early diversification strategy fades over a
period of time.
The study contributes to the existing knowledge of firm survival by adding the
dimension of diversification, and its timing by business start-ups. It presents a better
perspective of timing of diversification to the owners. Diversification can be a strategy
for young firms seeking growth, or simply seeking survival in the industry. In both cases,
when to diversify is an important decision that an owner has to make. Owners will be
better able to evaluate their chances of success once they know when to undertake
diversification activities. In this study, early diversifiers show a lower hazard of exit;
however, this effect fades out over a period of time. This implies that entrepreneurs
should try and leverage on the adoption of early diversification strategy. There is
evidence that an advantage gained in the initial years can yield lasting effects at the later
stages. At the same time, this advantage prepares an entrepreneur to recognize the
opportunities, and deal with threats (Geroski et al., 2010). It therefore becomes important
to build upon the advantage gained by the early diversifiers in the initial years.
In addition to making better decisions for the firm, owners will be aware of what
to expect once they have diversified, and face competition in the industry (Mata &
Portugal, 2002). Therefore, owners can even form a judgment on the survival path of the
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competitors, based on the product mix of its competitors, and whether or not they are
selling their goods in multiple markets.
Furthermore, accurate information on what affects a firm's performance, and
makes a firm successful is important in formulating policy programs. Consequently, this
analysis has some policy implications for the organizations like the Small Business
Administration (SBA) and Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE), which train
and assist business start-ups. If is it profitable for firms to diversify in the initial years,
they can provide assistance to owners in venturing out, and exploring new areas early on.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains why
large firms diversify, and which perspective best explains the act of diversification by
young firms. Section 3.3 describes the data and variables used for this study. Relevant
variables are constructed based on the literature of young firm survival, their growth path,
and the kind of diversification activities undertaken by them. Section 3.4 presents the
empirical estimation of differences in the survival rates of diversifiers and nondiversifiers using a Cox Proportional Hazard Model. Furthermore, it presents KaplanMeier survival graph of firms by diversifiers and non-diversifiers. Section 3.5 presents
the conclusion of the study with areas for future research.
3.2

Diversification
There is no clear evidence on what motivates a person to start a business;

however, he may start a business out of “necessity”, or out of “opportunity”. Opportunity
entrepreneurs enter into self-employment if they see a favorable environment to
materialize their idea. On the other hand, necessity entrepreneurs start their own business
because of limited/no employment opportunities in the labor market. There is evidence
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that highlights the relation between ability and self-employment, and corresponding
earnings associated with it (Astebro et al., 2008; Block and Wagner, 2010; Thompson,
2011).
In the first case, where an entrepreneur is pro-active, and starts a business out of
his own wish, and not because of some external factors, he will steer all the resources and
use the skill set in expanding the business by creating synergies across all existing units
in the firm. In other words, an owner can either combine the resources and create
synergies within the firm, or collaborate with other firms in the industry with similar
portfolios (Ansoff, 1965; Carter, 1977; Chatterjee, 1986). One of the underlying features
of diversification and expansion in this case is that the entrepreneur has confidence in the
success of the business.
In contrast, if the business is established because of the failure to find a job, or
losing a job; an entrepreneur might want to save a dying business by re-routing the
resources and his efforts into new areas. This implies that owners see diversification as
one of the routes to save a dying business, as a strategy to mitigate the risk attached to
one unit (Beattie, 1980; Booz et al., 1985; Jovanovic & Gilbert, 1993; Lynn & Reinsch,
1990), or even as a strategy to correct an entry mistake. Lynn (1998, p.42) identified such
a diversification strategy as, “crisis diversification”, and mentions that, “...an ownermanager diversifies because his/her established venture is perceived to be in serious
operational or financial trouble. In this case, diversification is pursued to 'save' the
primary business.”
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The underlying point here is that a new business is an alignment of
entrepreneurial effort, prior work experience, assets, human capital, equity and favorable
environmental conditions. While the set of strategic resources may be endowed to an
entrepreneur prior to entry in the market and establishing a new business, it is the
cognition of an entrepreneur that enables him to better recognize the opportunities and
threats in the market. An entrepreneur may accumulate the resources and expand the
business in the later years. However, prior work experience and knowledge about the
industry may act as an incentive for early diversification. It is therefore possible that even
in the initial years of a firm’s existence entrepreneurs diversify and expand the product
mix and/or geographical areas.
Geroski et al, (2010, p.510) mention that “in many cases, founding and
subsequent conditions can be similar.” Incidentally, the KFS data demonstrates that a
large percentage of firms have a high mean amount of initial assets13, revenue, and other
important resources a firm requires in the initial years (see Table 1.2 for the descriptives).
Furthermore, by definition, the level of education and prior experience of the owners will
not change over a period of time. Alternatively, it can be inferred that an entrepreneur
already possesses the skill set necessary to start a business similar to the existing one.
In addition, entrepreneurs do receive aid and advice from organizations that assist
small businesses. Indeed that does increase the repertoire of knowledge in the top
hierarchy. This implies that even in the initial years, start-up firms have the capability to
enter into new areas, or add another product line. Nonetheless, they are sometimes
13

Mean assets for years 1-4: $ 219,768; almost 40 % of businesses had assets in the range of $10,000
$100,000 in year 2004. Mean revenue for years 1-4: $247,604. For further details see Robb et al., (2009)
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restricted by capacity and resources. Consequently, an entrepreneur builds the dynamic
capabilities, accumulates the resources, and makes an attempt to overcome the capacity
constraint by accessing the financial markets, and creating synergies across firms.
Excess resource theory does explain the motivation to diversify; alternatively, it is
also interesting to observe how the process of business creation per-se is linked with the
act of diversification by start-ups. This perspective on resource build-up is not only valid
for large and established firms, but also for young and small businesses. The next section
creates a link up with the literature on large firm diversification.
3.2.1 Evidence from large firm diversification
Focusing on large firms, Montgomery (1994) aptly summarizes why firms
diversify. She talks about three broad perspectives: (i) market power view; (ii) resource
view; and (iii) agency view. The market power view highlights that diversification leads
to anti-competitive effects and helps a firm to gain “conglomerate power” (Hill, 1985, p.
828). This view is consistent with the objective of profit maximization. However, young
and small business start-ups that struggle to survive will not diversify just to gain market
power. Consequently, this view does not offer much explanation on why start-ups would
diversify.
The agency view extends from the principal-agent problem, where managers
work for shareholders in a corporate set-up. The two main features of the agency view, a
corporate structure, and the existence of managers, who work for the owners of a
company, are not representative of business start-ups. One of the major reasons,
particularly relevant to this data, is that almost 36% of the firms are established as sole
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proprietorships, and only 40% of the firms have employees (Robb et al., 2010). Even the
perspective of agency view explains a little about small business diversification.
Elaborating the seminal work of Penrose's “The Theory of the Growth of the
Firm” (1959), Mahoney and Pandian (1992. p.363) mention that “...the resource based
theory is concerned with the rate, direction, and performance implications of
diversification...” In other words, firms are constrained by the amount of resources they
have (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wernerfelt, 1984). These constraints could be lack of
funds, labor and opportunities to invest, or even insufficient managerial capacity.
Furthermore, these constraints also explain the differences in the speed with which each
unit works, where underutilized units/products/services lead to “slack resources”
(Chandler, 1962; Caves, 1980). Start-ups start small and gradually increase their size and
assets (Mata et al., 1995). During this process they build up a stock of excess resources.
Resource-based perspective provides the closest reasoning for diversification that is not
only valid for big corporations, but also for small business start-ups. In this study, startups possess the required resources even in the initial years, which cause firms to show an
early pattern of diversification.
Therefore, this study draws from two main strands of literature. First, firm
diversification based on the resource-based view of the firm (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992;
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984); and second, young firm survival and founding
conditions (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995; Bruderl, 1992; Geroski et al., 2010; Klepper,
2002; Romanelli, 1989). From the above discussion, it is inferred that, young firms can
diversify even in the initial years of their existence. This proposition is tested using the
KFS data, which is described in the next section.
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3.3

Sample Description
3.3.1 Data
The study uses confidential micro-data provided by the KFS through the NORC

data enclave. This study focuses on data collected in the first seven years of a firm's
existence (calendar years 2004-2010). The study only includes permanent failure and
excludes firms that have been temporarily out of business. Refusals and non-responses
have also been excluded from the data-set to maintain consistency in defining “failure”.
Accordingly, 1,999 firms are taken out from the sample because: (i) they temporarily
went out of business, (ii) non-response/refusal, (iii) they were merged with another
business or sold, or (iv) had missing data, or (v) reported no owner. The final sample size
used in this study consists of 2,870 firms14.
The KFS provides NAICS and ZIP codes for each firm. This helps in categorizing
the firms in different regions and labor market areas (LMA). “A general definition for a
labor market area is an economically integrated geographic area within which individuals
can reside, and find employment within a reasonable distance or can readily change
employment without changing their place of residence. LMA are metropolitan areas,
micropolitan areas, or small labor market areas”15. Labor markets are not based on the
county lines; rather they are created by the interrelationships amongst buyers and sellers
of labor in that area16 . Based on this information, the KFS data is matched with the
County Business Patterns (CBP) Series of the U.S. Census Bureau, and two industry
14

For details on the construction of survey, see Chapter 1, section1.3.2.4

15

Refer: http://www.bls.gov/lau/lmadir.pdf

16

Refer: http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-marketareas/documentation.aspx
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indices are created that account for a region's localization and urbanization. The next
subsection explains how variables are created.
3.3.2 Variable construction
3.3.2.1 Diversification
The way diversification is defined in this study is different from the traditional
measures followed in the literature. Neither does this study use the standard product
count (SIC Classification), nor does the categorical classification either by Rumelt (1974,
1982), or a composite index defined by Gort (1962). The reason is that the KFS does not
report the SIC Code of products produced by the firms. However, the data does indicate
whether the firm is manufacturing a product or providing a service. Further, the KFS also
reports information on, “how many other new businesses has the owner started besides
the existing business”, and, “was this business/businesses in the same industry as the
existing business17”? These two variables form the basis of identifying diversification.
This classification is closest to Ansoff's (1957, 1965) concept of diversification, which
focuses on the entry of firms into new markets with new products (Lynn, 1998). In this
study, diversification strategy is calculated on two counts:
1. Internal Diversification: adding products &/or services - This captures the
timing when a firm makes a switch from providing only a product/service to adding both
a product and a service to its portfolio, and it is a dummy variable that takes value “1” if a
firm diversifies, else “0”.
2. Multiple Firm Diversification: adding new businesses - This can further take
two forms: (i) related diversification: adding a new business in the same industry as the
17

For details, see Robb et al., (2009, 2010)
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existing business; (ii) unrelated diversification: adding a new business in a new industry
that is different from the existing business. Related and unrelated diversifications are both
dummy variables that take on values “1” if a firm diversifies, else “0”.
A firm is considered as a diversifier if it ever diversifies in either of the above
mentioned classifications. The main focus of the study is to capture the timing when a
firm first decides to venture into new area; therefore, a time-variant variable “diversified”
is created. This time-varying indicator is equal to “1” in time t if a firm had diversified
prior to this, else “0”. To illustrate, if a firm diversifies in the first year, the variable takes
value “1” from year 1 to 7. However, if a firm diversifies in year two, the variable
diversified, takes the value “0” in the first year, and starting the second year it takes the
value “1”. To further examine whether the positive effect of diversification is persistent,
another variable, “time since diversification” is created which is an interaction between
time and the variable “diversified”.
Therefore, once a firm diversifies it stays as diversified until the end of the study,
or until it exits the market, whichever is earlier. Further, if a firm switches from a “nondiversifier” to a “diversifier” in the middle of the study; it is labeled as a diversifier from
that year onwards, and it stays in the same category till the end.
Approximately 62% (1,798) of firms diversified in the very first year. The pace of
venturing into newer areas dropped with time (see Table 3.1, which provides the numbers
on firms that diversified and survived in each year). Approximately 91% of firms
survived until the first follow-up survey. Survival rate for firms in the KFS is higher than
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in other records available on small businesses18. To illustrate, the U.S. Small Business
Administration measures this one year survival rate to be 75% for the firms started in
year 1997 (Robb et al., 2009). The initial sample in the KFS consists of 2,870 firms, of
which 1,995 (64%) are still in operation by the fifth follow-up survey. Using the Bureau
of Labor Statistics data, Knaup & Piazza (2007) measured the five year survival rate at
40%. The KFS assigns this difference in survival rates to missing the failures in the year
prior to the initial screening in 2004 (Renski, 2012).
Table 3.1 Composition of the Final KFS Sample
Follow up
year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

Beginning
of the year
2,870
2,640
2,382
2,152
1,995
1,857
1,740
-

Exits
230
488
718
875
1,013
1,130
-

Survival
rate (%)
91.99
83.00
74.98
69.51
64.70
60.63
-

No. Firms
Diversified
1,798
169
62
40
12
16
9
2,106

% Firms
Diversified
62.64
6.40
2.60
1.85
0.60
0.86
0.51
-

3.3.2.2 Firm specific variables
Researchers have shown a strong linkage between the initial size of a start-up and
its survival rate (Audretsch & Mahmood 1995; Bruderl et al. 1992; Dunne & Hughes
1994). Following the general practice, the total number of employees (full-time and parttime) is used to represent the current firm size (Mata et al., 1995; Mata & Portugal,
1994). Owners are excluded while calculating total number of employees.
To account for the financial stability of a firm in the market, the credit rating of
the firm is included as an explanatory variable. It takes values from 1 to 3, “1” = high
credit score, “2” = medium credit score, and “3” = low credit score. These credit ratings
18

For details see Robb et al., (2010)
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are provided by Dun & Bradstreet. It should be noted that the age of the firms is
automatically controlled in the sample because all firms are born at the same time.
Firm growth is also added as an independent variable that differentiates the timing
of diversification for firms with increasing or decreasing growth rates (Mata et al., 1995).
If a firm is incurring losses and not growing, then a probable reason for diversification in
this case, if there is any, would be to correct the entry mistake and minimize losses. In
contrast, if the firm is growing and reports higher revenue, this implies that the firm has
built up slack resources and pro-actively wants to diversify. For this analysis, the
percentage change in the return on asset (ROA) for each contiguous year is calculated to
represent the firm growth rate. It measures the return per dollar over total assets that
constitute a sum total of borrowed money and owner's equity. Moreover it accounts for
the efficiency of the firm, in addition to the profitability of the firm.
3.3.2.3 Human capital
Prior knowledge, work experience of the founding team, and the owner's level of
education are considered as one of the significant predictors of business survival and
success (Bates, 1990; Bruderl et al., 1992; Baptista & Karaoz, 2006). Human capital of
the firm in this study is measured using the following variables: (i) previous business
experience of the main owner, (ii) main owner's education – the KFS reports education in
the form of highest degree earned. This variable has been converted into years of
education (see Table 3.2), (iii) age of the main owner. To capture non-linearity in age,
age square is also added to the list of independent variables.
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Human capital renders competitive advantage to the firm that is unique to it, and
cannot be imitated by its competitors (Geroski et al., 2010). The literature also suggests
that, more than physical assets, it is the human capital that provides an edge to a firm
when compared to similar firms in the industry (Teece, 1998). Therefore, intangible
assets are measured by dividing the number of employees in R&D, by the total number of
employees in the firm. This will also capture the extent to which a firm is committed to
improving its technological capabilities.
Table 3.2 Years of Education
Value
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Description reported in the KFS
Less than 9th grade
Some high school, but no diploma
High school graduate (diploma or equivalent
diploma [GED])
Technical, trade or vocational degree
Some college, but no degree
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Some graduate school but no degree
Master’s degree
Professional school or doctorate

Converted to Years of Education
5
9
12
13
13.5
14
16
16
18
21

3.3.2.4 Industry and regional controls
Favorable market conditions are considered to be an important determinant of
firm survival and growth, and therefore they have a potential impact on the likelihood
and timing of diversification activities. To illustrate, a friendly financial framework, and
a supportive infrastructure will assist small business activities that would encourage them
to undertake production of new goods into new markets.
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Industry and regional level controls are drawn from the literature, and include the
variables that account for industry concentration, urbanization, and business cycles.
(Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Mata & Portugal, 1994, 2002; Mata et al., 1995).
The literature on organizational ecology places a great emphasis on the total
number of firms in the market, the distribution of large and small firms, and the level of
urbanization in an area (Hannan & Carrol, 1992). It has been established that these
factors are not only important for the survival of a firm, they also facilitate
diversification. The literature on industrial organization also suggests that market
concentration promotes integration between, and across firms (Bunch and Smiley, 1992),
which eventually adds to the portfolio of firms. In this study, Renski's classification
(2012) is used to measure industry concentration and urbanization19. Employment and
establishment data are derived from the CBP database of the U.S. Census Bureau for
2004, and then aggregated to the level of LMA20. The two variables created using this
data are industry concentration and urbanization.
Industry concentration or localization represents the density of firms that are
closely related, and is measured as the number of establishments in the same four digit
NAICS industry as the start-ups in the KFS data. A highly concentrated market may
show signs of stagnation in an industry, thereby motivating firms to look for
opportunities to grow elsewhere. The level of urbanization is measured as the total
number of employees in all industries in the LMA, and it serves as a control for
localization. Urbanization may provide a supportive environment to start-ups by
19

For details see Renski, (2012), The industry indices used in this study are created by Renski (2012)

20

For a detailed analysis on computation of the variables, refer to:
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data products/commuting-zones-and-labor-market-areas.aspx.
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providing better infrastructure and accessible resources. “While urban environments act
as new firm incubators or nurseries, agglomeration diseconomies result in firm death or
relocation (Fotopoulos & Louri, 2000).” This implies that urbanization can generate
results either in favor of firm survival or otherwise (Renski, 2009, 2012), depending on
whether it yields economies or diseconomies.
Similar to the broader framework of industry urbanization, macroeconomic
environment can also produce results in either direction. Favorable environmental
conditions may make an entrepreneur complacent, with an expectation of growth in the
same industry; or motivate him to explore new areas. To account for the great recession:
a global economic decline that started in year 2007, and how the current state of economy
affects the prospects of a business to venture into new areas, a dummy variable
“business-cycle” is included. Business cycles are calculated using the unemployment
rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics21, that take “1” as a value if in the prior year the
unemployment rate went down, else “0”.
Further, to account for differences across states, firms are categorized into six
broad areas using the geographical codes (zip code, metropolitan statistical area, and
state) provided in the data: 1-Midwest, 2-Southwest, 3-Northeast, 4-Southeast, 5-Central,
6-West. In the empirical analysis, results are compared with “Midwest” as the base.
Survival rates also vary across industries. Consequently, six dummies are created that
capture broad industrial classification: 1-Agriculture, Construction & Transportation, 2Manufacturing, 3-Wholesale, Retail and Entertainment, 4-Information Services, 5-

21

Refer: http://www.bls.gov/lau/#tables
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Business Professional & Administrative Services, 6-Other Services. Table 3.3 lists the
variables used in the study along with the descriptive statistics.
3.4 Empirical Estimation
This section examines whether the timing of diversification affects the survival of
start-ups. Two sets of analyses are conducted. The first plots a Kaplan-Meier survivor
function. It compares the survival graphs for the firms based on time-varying variable
diversified. In the second analysis, a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model is
used to examine the survival pattern. The KFS uses a stratified sampling design, and the
data is divided in three strata based on technology and gender. The KFS oversamples the
firms in high-technology stratum. The empirical analysis therefore recognizes the survey
nature of the KFS, and includes the sampling weights while conducting the survival
analysis, making the results a representative of all firms in the United States.
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Table 3.3 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Description

Mean

Std.Dev.

Firm Specific Variables
Firm Size
Credit Ranking
Intangible Assets
Firm Growth

Number of Employees (Full Time and Part Time)
“1”= High, “2” = Medium, “3” = Low
No. of employees in R&D divided by total no. of employees in the firm
Percentage change in return on asset x 100

2.35
2.00
0.13
0.61

8.15
0.61
0.44
39.07

13.26
15.27
45.97
-

11.00
2.51
10.97
-

8.45

14.65

12.76
0.57
-

15.00
0.49
-

-

-

Human Capital
Prior Work Experience
Education
Age
Age square

Years of work experience of the main owner in the same industry
Years of education of main owner
Age of the main owner at the start of business
Age*Age

Industry and Regional Controls
Concentration
Urbanization
Business cycle
Region
Industry

Number of establishments in same 4 digit NAICS industry as the startup x 100
Number of employees in all industries in the LMA x 100,000
Bs cycle=1 if unemployment rate decreases, else =0
6 Regions: 1-Midwest, 2-Southwest, 3-Northeast, 4-Southeast, 5Central, 6-West
6 Industries: 1-Agriculture, Construction & Transportation, 2Manufacturing, 3-Wholesale, Retail and Entertainment, 4-Information
Services, 5-Business Professional & Administrative Services, 6-Other
Services
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3.4.1 Non parametric analysis
Figure 3.1 presents a Kaplan-Meier comparative survival curve at time t of all
firms that had and had not diversified by time t-1. There is a clear evidence of firms that
diversified at some point does show a higher survival rate as compared to nondiversifiers. Results have been tested for the equality of survivor functions across the
diversifiers and non-diversifiers using a log-rank test. The log-rank test yields a chisquare value of 8.85, which is significant at 1%. Furthermore, after the second year, the
two survivor curves are almost parallel, and the gap between the curves is also
maintained. These results are put to empirical estimation using the Cox-proportional
hazard model in the next sub-section.
Figure 3.1 Survivor Functions, by Time Variant Diversification
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3.4.2 Semi parametric analysis
The dependent variable in this study is the binary variable that measures the
likelihood of failure, and takes “1” as the value if a firm exits the market, else “0”.
Independent variables are included based on their relevance in the literature of firm
survival. The model can be written as:

h

j

(t ) =

h

0

(
+
)
(t ) e β 0 x j β x ,

(3)

Where hj is the hazard firm j faces, and it is a function of baseline hazard, h0,
faced by everyone, and modified by xj. The hazard faced by firm j is multiplicatively
proportional to the baseline hazard (Cox, 1972), thus named as the proportional hazards
model. The Cox proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric model that assumes no
parametric form of the survivor function, consequently, h0(t), the baseline hazard is left
unestimated, and cancelled out while performing the binary outcome analysis. Examining
the survivor curves explained in the above section, along with the empirical estimates
offer a clear explanation for differences in the survival rates between early diversifiers
and non-early diversifiers. Table 3.4 presents the results from the Cox-proportional
hazard model, and lists both, the coefficients and hazard ratio.
The coefficient with negative sign indicates a positive effect on survival, and
shows that the hazard of exit has decreased. Similarly, a positive coefficient shows a
negative effect on survival and an increase in the hazard of exit. Hazard can be
interpreted as the failure, and it describes the probability that a firm will exit the market,
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given it survived until the beginning of that year. If S(t) represents the survivor function,
hazard rate can be written as: H(t) = -ln{S(t)}.
Interpreting the results in the light of the Cox-proportional hazard model, firms
that diversify early, show a higher survival rate as compared to firms that do not
diversify. The coefficient of the variable diversified is negative and statistically
significant. In other words, whatever is the hazard rate at a particular time for the firms
that do not diversify in year t, the hazard at the same time for those that do diversify is
0.55 times that hazard. Accordingly, all else equal, firms that diversify early are almost
1.8 22 times more likely to survive as compared to firms that did not diversify, and
survived that year.
The coefficient on variable, time since diversification is positive and statistically
significant. This variable tests whether the positive effect of diversification is persistent
or not; and a positive coefficient implies that this effect fades with time. The estimated
effect of diversifying is zero after the fourth year23, and all firms face a hazard ratio of
one. In other words, a hazard ratio of one implies that, variable time since diversification
has no effect on baseline hazard after the fourth year. The important point to take from
these results is that young firms do diversify early; and at the same time show a higher
survival rate when compared to the non-diversifiers. However, this effect does not last for
a long period of time, and starts to fade away.

22

[exp(0.550)=1.81]

23

Equating the coefficient of diversification, b(t) = 0 => -0.598 +0.152*t = 0 => t= 3.9,
This implies that, after year 4, the estimated effect of diversifying is zero. Similarly, hazard ratio, h(t) =
exp(-0.598+0.152*3.9) =1

91

Table 3.4 Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates
VARIABLES
Diversified
t since diversification
Medium Credit Rating
Low Credit Rating
Firm Size
Firm Growth Rate
Age of the Owner
Age Square
Intangible Assets
Work Experience
Education
Business Cycle
Concentration
Urbanization
Southwest
Northeast
Southeast
Central
West
Observations
Log likelihood
Chi Square

(1)
Coefficient
-0.0598***
(0.164)
0.152***
(0.040)
0.166*
(0.095)
0.412***
(0.110)
-4.648***
(0.604)
-0.898***
(0.062)
-0.046*
(0.018)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.149
(0.186)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.031*
(0.014)
-1.410
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.002*
(0.003)
0.255*
(0.132)
-0.051
(0.111)
0.283*
(0.103)
0.025
(0.116)
0.206*
(0.104)
14768
-6277
1788

(2)
Hazard ratio
0.550***
(0.090)
1.164***
(0.047)
1.180*
(0.113)
1.510***
(0.166)
0.010***
(0.006)
0.407***
(0.025)
0.955*
(0.017)
1.000*
(0.000)
1.161
(0.216)
0.994*
(0.003)
0.970*
(0.013)
0.244
(0.000)
0.998
(0.004)
1.005*
(0.003)
1.291*
(0.170)
0.950
(0.105)
1.328*
(0.137)
1.025
(0.119)
1.229*
(0.128)
14768
-6277
1788

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.005, * p<0.10
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Firm specific variables yield expected results, where firms with larger size and a
higher growth rate have a higher survival rate. Further, credit rating of the firm being a
categorical variable, high credit ranking is the omitted group, and forms the base level for
analysis. When compared with high credit rated firms, medium credit rating firms face
18%24 greater hazard of exit. In addition, firms with lower credit rating face an even
higher (51% 25 ) hazard of exit. This implies that a higher credit ranking does have a
positive impact on the survival of young firms. Coefficient of intangible assets yields an
insignificant result. The reason for this could be that young firms do not place much
emphasis on the R&D. Moreover, the majority of the firms in the data do not have
employees working in the area of R&D.
Analyzing the human capital of the firm, a one year increase in the age of an
owner decreases the hazard by 4.5%. This result becomes more meaningful, once read
along with the coefficient of owner’s work experience and education. Better education
and a higher work experience do reduce the hazard of exit, as does the age of the owner.
However, it should be noted that the magnitude is much less.
The variable “business cycle” is constructed using the current unemployment
rates, and it shows a negative coefficient. This implies that a favorable business cycle, or
a decrease in unemployment rate, decreases the hazard of exit; however the coefficient is
insignificant. Analyzing the industry indices, higher concentration does result in a higher
survival rate; however, the result is insignificant. Market concentration is defined as the

24

[exp(0.166)=1.180]

25

[exp(0.418)=1.518]
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number of establishments in the same industry as the start-up is. Incidentally, firms that
are too concentrated give up on the competition, and increase the probability of survival.
One of the interesting results is given by the “industry urbanization”. Existence of
larger firms in this case lessened the survival chances of small business start-ups. As
discussed earlier, urbanization can yield the results in either direction, causing economies
or diseconomies. In this case, a higher level of urbanization causes net agglomeration
diseconomies, which increases the hazard rate for start-ups. “Region” again is a
categorical variable, and Midwest is the omitted variable and forms the basis of analysis.
When compared with the Midwest, only the Northeast region shows a lower hazard of
exit. Firms in the Northeast face 95% of the hazard that firms face in the Midwest;
however, this result is insignificant. The rest of the regions show a higher hazard rate as
compared to the Midwest; however, only the firms in the Central area show an
insignificant result. The analysis also controlled for the industries, and the base industry
is agriculture, manufacturing and transportation. When compared with the base industry,
only “other services” show a higher and significant survival rate.
3.5

Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of early diversification strategy on the survival of

firms. One of the significant results from the above analysis is that the majority of firms
in the KFS diversified (in some form or another) in the first two years. This feature is
consistent with a high survival rate, where early diversifiers did show a lower hazard of
exit from the market.
It is generally expected that business start-ups do not undertake any
diversification activity in the initial years. This study presents a contrary view, and
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demonstrates that out of 90% (2,870) of the firms that survived the first follow-up, 62%
(1,798) of the firms diversified, and stayed as diversifiers till the end of the study, or exit
from the market, whichever was earlier.
The factors that affect the survival in this study are in consonance with the general
literature on firm survival. Firm size and growth rate positively contribute towards the
higher survival rate. The entrepreneur does play a significant role in the firm’s survival
and adoption of early diversification strategies. Education, work experience, and age all
contribute positively towards the survival. Pre-entry experience in the same industry and
education do show significant results.
Prior experience has proved to have a persistent effect on survival; and this effect
is more pronounced if the work experience is in the same industry, which is the case in
the sample under consideration (Klepper & Simons, 2003; Thompson, 2005). For this
reason, it can be interpreted that firms do have access to the resources even in the initial
years. Linking this thought with the “resource based theory” also explains the reason for
early diversification activity by the firms. Firms are capable of starting something similar
and/or new with the amount of resources available to them.
Further, increased market concentration decreases the hazard of exit, which
implies that a highly concentrated industry motivates a firm to diversify at an early stage.
Stagnation in the market demand forces firms to expand their portfolio and geographical
areas. Consequently, one can interpret that these firms did not diversify out of necessity,
but chose diversification as one of their growth strategies. This is evident from the set of
resources available to the start-ups in the form of personal assets, angel capital, venture
capital, loan and debt. Developed financial market may contribute towards adoption of
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such a strategy. Furthermore, firms with a higher credit rating show higher survival rate
that signals toward a developed capital market.
However, another important result from the study is that the positive effect of
diversification decays over time, and after the fourth year all the firms face the same
hazard of exit, irrespective of whether they diversified or not. In other words, positive
effect of diversification is not persistent. There is evidence of founding conditions having
lasting effects on a firm’s growth and rate of survival (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995;
Astebro & Bernhardt, 2003; Huynh et al., 2008; Geroski et al. 2010; Mata et al. 1995). In
contrast, in this study, the early effects of diversification decay after fourth year.
Therefore, favorable founding and current conditions help the firms to grow and
proactively choose diversification as a growth strategy. In other words, the choices that
start-ups make in the initial years do affect their survival; however, the effect of early
diversification strategy dies off in the coming years. The study incorporates current as
well as founding conditions of the firm and finds support for main drivers of survival:
firm’s growth, entrepreneurial experience, education, and urbanization.
One of the major limitations of the study is that it fails to address the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity. Forward-looking entrepreneurs may show a lower hazard of
exit, and a higher growth rate. In other words, entrepreneurs are not homogeneous, and
high ability entrepreneurs may survive longer and show a higher rate of diversification.
High ability entrepreneurs would be more motivated to diversify. In other words, firm
survival and success are correlated with ability; however, ability remains unobservable.
An attempt was made to differentiate between the firms that diversify out of
necessity, and firms that seek diversification as a growth strategy. However, due to
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missing observations, valid and meaningful results could not be obtained. There are
limitations in the data that do not allow resolving this issue of unobserved heterogeneity.
A variable “confidence” was created to capture entrepreneurial confidence in the business
using survey questions: “did the business have a competitive advantage over their
competitors”, and second, “during the calendar year, was there any time when the
business needed credit but did not apply because you or others associated with the
business thought the application would be denied”? These variables reported more
missing values, throwing out a lot of observations from the analysis. For future research,
entrepreneurial confidence can be added into the analysis using additional years of data
provided by the KFS.
Another area for future research is to ascertain what happens to the firms in the
future years that choose to diversify, as compared to the firms that still choose to remain
specialist (non-diversifier), and survive the follow-up years. In this study, the effect of
early diversification is lost after the fourth year. Addressing the above two limitations
with the additional data may highlight the effect of entrepreneurial motivation, and risk
taking ability, on the adoption of diversification strategies, and survival rate. This
question can be addressed with more waves of data being included for the analysis.
Nonetheless, the study tries to address the issue of timing and persistence of
diversification for start-ups that has not been examined in detail. These results can be
generalized across young firms in the U.S., and they do have policy implication for the
agencies that assist and train small businesses, where they can provide assistance to the
owners in venturing out, and exploring new areas at early stages. However, the main task
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for these organizations and entrepreneurs is to sustain the edge gained by a firm at an
early stage of its existence.

98

REFERENCES
Acs, Z. J., Anselin, L., & Varga, A. (2002). Patents and innovation counts as measures of
regional production of new knowledge. Research Policy, 31(7), 1069-1085.
Acs, Z. J., & Audretsch, D. B. (1987). Innovation, market structure, and firm size. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4), pp. 567-574.
Agarwal, R., & Gort, M. (1996). The evolution of markets and entry, exit and survival of
firms. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 489-498.
Albert, M. (2001). Bayesian learning and expectations formation: Anything
goes. Foundations of Bayesianism, 24, 351-372.
Albuquerque, R., & Hopenhayn, H. A. (2004). Optimal lending contracts and firm
dynamics. The Review of Economic Studies, 71(2), pp. 285-315.
Ansoff, H. I. (1957). Strategies for diversification. Harvard Business Review, 35(5), 113124.
Ansoff, H. I. (1965). Corporate strategy: An analytic approach to business policy for
growth and expansion McGraw-Hill New York.
Arthur, W. B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by
historical events. The Economic Journal, 99(394), 116-131.
Åstebro, T., & Bernhardt, I. (2003). Start-up financing, owner characteristics, and
survival. Journal of Economics and Business, 55(4), 303-319.
Astebro, T., Chen, J., & Thompson, P. (2008). Stars and misfits: A theory of occupational
choice. Working Papers, Florida International University
Audretsch, D. B. (1995). Innovation, growth and survival. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 13(4), 441-457.
Audretsch, D. B., & Acs, Z. J. (1994). New-firm startups, technology, and
macroeconomic fluctuations. Small Business Economics, 6(6), 439-449.
Audretsch, D. B., & Mahmood, T. (1995). New firm survival: New results using a hazard
function. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 97-103.
Auerswald, P. E. (2008). Entrepreneurship in the theory of the firm. Small Business
Economics, 30(2), 111-126.

99

Baloff, N. (1971). Extension of the learning curve--some empirical results. Operational
Research Quarterly, 329-340.
Baptista, R., & Karaöz, M. (2006). Entrepreneurial human capital and the early survival
chances
of
new
start-ups:
Opportunity-based
vs.
necessity-based
entrepreneurship. Working Paper
Baptista, R., Karaöz, M., & Leitão, J. (2010). Diversification by young, small
firms. Paper Presented at the Summer Conference 2010, DRUID
Bates, T. (1990). Entrepreneur human capital inputs and small business longevity. The
Review of Economics and Statistics,551-559.
Beattie, D. (1980). Conglomerate diversification and performance: A survey and time
series analysis. Applied Economics, 12(3), 251-273.
Berk, J. B., Stanton, R., & Zechner, J. (2010). Human capital, bankruptcy, and capital
structure. The Journal of Finance, 65(3), 891-926.
Bhaird, C., & Lucey, B. (2006). What determines the capital structure of SMEs: Irish
evidence. Unpublished Working Paper
Black, S. E., & Lynch, L. M. (2004). What's driving the new economy?: The benefits of
workplace innovation. The Economic Journal, 114(493), F97-F116.
Block, J. H., & Wagner, M. (2010). Necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs in germany:
Characteristics and earnings differentials. Schmalenbach Business Review
(Sbr), 62(2), 154-174.
Block, Z., & MacMillan, I. C. (1985). Milestones for successful venture
planning. Harvard Business Review, 63(5), 184-196.
Blundell, R., & MaCurdy, T. (1999). Labor supply: A review of alternative
approaches. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 1559-1695.
Booz, A. Hamilton. 1985. diversification: A survey of european chief executives. booz,
allen and hamilton. Inc., New York,
Brav, O. (2009). Access to capital, capital structure, and the funding of the firm. The
Journal of Finance, 64(1), 263-308.
Brüderl, J., Preisendörfer, P., & Ziegler, R. (1992). Survival chances of newly founded
business organizations. American Sociological Review, 227-242.

100

Bullard, J., & Duffy, J. (1994). Using genetic algorithms to model the evolution of
heterogeneous beliefs. Working Paper Series
Bunch, D. S., & Smiley, R. (1992). Who deters entry? evidence on the use of strategic
entry deterrents. The Review of Economics and Statistics,509-521.
Cabral, L. M. B., & Mata, J. (2003). On the evolution of the firm size distribution: Facts
and theory. The American Economic Review, 93(4), pp. 1075-1090.
Carter, J. R. (1977). In search of synergy: A structure-performance test. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 59(3), 279-289.
Cassar, G., & Craig, J. (2009). An investigation of hindsight bias in nascent venture
activity. Journal of Business Venturing, 24(2), 149-164.
Casson, M. (1982). The entrepreneur: An economic theory Rowman & Littlefield Pub
Incorporated.
Casson, M. (2005). Entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 58(2), 327-348.
Caves, R. E. (1980). Industrial organization, corporate strategy and structure. Journal of
Economic Literature, 18(1), 64-92.
Cefis, E., & Marsili, O. (2005). A matter of life and death: Innovation and firm
survival. Industrial and Corporate Change, 14(6), 1167-1192.
Chandler, A. D. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the industrial
enterprise.
Chapple, K., Markusen, A., Schrock, G., Yamamoto, D., & Yu, P. (2004). Gauging
metropolitan “High-tech” and “I-tech” activity. Economic Development
Quarterly, 18(1), 10-29.
Chatterjee, S. (1986). Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions
on merging and rival firms. Strategic Management Journal, 7(2), 119-139.
Chiao, C. (2002). Relationship between debt, R&D and physical investment, evidence
from US firm-level data. Applied Financial Economics, 12(2), 105-121.
Christensen, C. M. (1997). The innovator's dilemma: When new technologies cause great
firms to fail Harvard Business Press.
Cohen, W. M., & Klepper, S. (1996). A reprise of size and R & D. The Economic
Journal, 106(437), 925-951.

101

Cohen, W. M., & Levin, R. C. (1989). Empirical studies of innovation and market
structure. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 2, 1059-1107.
Cooley, T. F., & Quadrini, V. (2001). Financial markets and firm dynamics. The
American Economic Review, 91(5), pp. 1286-1310.
Cox, D. R. (1972). Regression models and life-tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society.Series B (Methodological), 187-220.
Czarnitzki, D., & Kraft, K. (2009). Capital control, debt financing and innovative
activity. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2), 372-383.
Davidsson, P., Delmar, F., & Wiklund, J. (2006). Entrepreneurship and the growth of
firms Edward Elgar Pub.
Dawid, H. (1999). Adaptive learning by genetic algorithms: Analytical results and
applications to economic models Springer Verlag.
DeGroot, M. H. (2004). Optimal statistical decisions Wiley-IEEE.
Delmar, F. (2006). Measuring growth: Methodological considerations and empirical
results. Entrepreneurship and the Growth of Firms, , 62-86.
DesRoches, D., Robb, A., & Mulcahy, T. M. (2008). Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS)Baseline/First/Second Follow-Ups: Study Metadata Documentation,
Diambeidou, M. B., François, D., Gailly, B., Verleysen, M., & Wertz, V. (2007). An
empirical taxonomy of start-up firms growth trajectories. The OECD
Entrepreneurship Indicators Programme: Workshop on the Measurement of HighGrowth Enterprises,
Dobbs, M., & Hamilton, R. (2007). Small business growth: Recent evidence and new
directions. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, 13(5),
296-322.
Døving, E., & Gooderham, P. N. (2008). Dynamic capabilities as antecedents of the
scope of related diversification: The case of small firm accountancy
practices. Strategic Management Journal, 29(8), 841-857.
Dunne, P., & Hughes, A. (1994). Age, size, growth and survival: UK companies in the
1980s. The Journal of Industrial Economics, , 115-140.
Dunne, T., Roberts, M. J., & Samuelson, L. (1989). The growth and failure of U. S.
manufacturing plants. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), pp. 671-698.

102

Easley, D., & Kiefer, N. M. (1988). Controlling a stochastic process with unknown
parameters. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1045-1064.
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Kwok, C. C. Y., & Mishra, D. R. (2010). Does corporate
social responsibility affect the cost of capital?
Fotopoulos, G., & Louri, H. (2000). Location and survival of new entry. Small Business
Economics, 14(4), 311-321.
Galbraith, J. K. (1952). American capitalism. the concept of countervailing
power, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Garnsey, E., Stam, E., & Heffernan, P. (2006). New firm growth: Exploring processes
and paths. Industry and Innovation, 13(1), 1.
Geroski, P. A. (1995). What do we know about entry? International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 13(4), 421-440.
Geroski, P. A., Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2010). Founding conditions and the survival of
new firms. Strategic Management Journal, 31(5), 510-529.
Geroski, P. A., Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2007). Founding conditions and the survival of
new firmsDRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial
Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
Giarratana, M. S. (2004). The birth of a new industry: Entry by start-ups and the drivers
of firm growth: The case of encryption software. Research Policy, 33(5), 787-806.
Gort, M. (1962). Diversification and integration in american industry Princeton
University Press.
Hannan, M. T., & Carroll, G. (1992). Dynamics of organizational populations: Density,
legitimation, and competition Oxford University Press, USA.
Heaton, J., & Lucas, D. (2001). Capital structure, hurdle rates, and portfolio choice
interactions in an entrepreneurial firm. Unpublished Working Paper.Northwestern
University, Evanston,
Heckler, D. E. (2005). High-technology employment: A NAICS-based update. Monthly
Labor Review, 128(7), 57-72.
Hill, C. W. L. (1985). Diversified growth and competition: The experience of twelve
large UK firms. Applied Economics, 17(5), 827-847.

103

Himmelberg, C. P., & Petersen, B. C. (1994). R & D and internal finance: A panel study
of small firms in high-tech industries. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 76(1), 38-51.
Holmstrom, B. (1989). Agency costs and innovation. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 12(3), 305-327.
Huynh, K. P., & Petrunia, R. J. (2010). Age effects, leverage and firm growth. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(5), 1003-1013.
Huynh, K. P., Petrunia, R. J., & Voia, M. C. (2008). Startup financial conditions and
survival of new firms.
Irwin, D. A., & Klenow, P. J. (1994). Learning-by-doing spillovers in the semiconductor
industry. Journal of Political Economy, 1200-1227.
Jovanovic, B., & Gilbert, R. J. (1993). The diversification of production. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity.Microeconomics, 1993(1), pp. 197-247.
Kennickell, A. B. (1997). Multiple imputation and disclosure protection: The case of the
1995 survey of consumer finances. Record Linkage Techniques, 248–267.
Kim,
D.
J.,
&
Kogut,
B.
(1996).
Technological
diversification. Organization Science, , 283-301.

platforms

and

Klenow, P. J. (1998). Learning curves and the cyclical behavior of manufacturing
industries. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(2), 531-550.
Klepper, S. (2002). Firm survival and the evolution of oligopoly. RAND Journal of
Economics, , 37-61.
Knaup, A. E., & Piazza, M. C. (2007). Business employment dynamics data: Survival
and longevity, II. Monthly Lab.Rev. 130, 3.
Korunka, C., Kessler, A., Frank, H., & Lueger, M. (2011). Conditions for growth in oneperson startups: A longitudinal study spanning eight years. Psicothema, 23(3), 446452.
Koski, H., Marengo, L., & Mäkinen, I. (2009). Firm size, managerial practices and
innovativeness: Some evidence from finnish manufacturing. LEM Papers Series
Laursen, K., & Foss, N. J. (2003). New human resource management practices,
complementarities and the impact on innovation performance. Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 27(2), 243.

104

Lazear, E. P., & Oyer, P. (2007). Personnel economics. SSRN eLibrary,
Lemieux, T., MacLeod, W. B., & Parent, D. (2009). Performance pay and wage
inequality-super-. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1), 1-49.
Levinthal, D. A. (1993). Learning and schumpeterian dynamics Wharton School, Snider
Entrepreneurial Center.
Lynn, M. L. (1998). Patterns of micro-enterprise diversification in transitional eurasian
economies. International Small Business Journal, 16(2), 34-49.
Lynn, M. L., & Reinsch, N. L. J. (1990). Diversification patterns among small
businesses. Journal of Small Business Management, 28(4), 60-70.
Mac An Bhaird, C., & Lucey, B. (2006). What determines the capital structure of SMEs:
Irish evidence. Working Paper, Dublin City University and Trinity College Dublin,
Mahoney, J. T., & Pandian, J. R. (1992). The resource‐based view within the
conversation of strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 13(5), 363380.
Marcet, A., & Nicolini, J. (2003). Recurrent hyperinflations and learning. American
Economic Review, 93(5), 1476–1498.
Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (1994). Life duration of new firms. The Journal of Industrial
Economics, 42(3), 227-245.
Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2002). The survival of new domestic and foreign‐owned
firms. Strategic Management Journal, 23(4), 323-343.
Mata, J., Portugal, P., & Guimaraes, P. (1995). The survival of new plants: Start-up
conditions and post-entry evolution. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 13(4), 459-481.
Milani, F. (2007). Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 54(7), 2065-2082.
Minniti, M., & Bygrave, W. (2001). A dynamic model of entrepreneurial
learning. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 25(3)
Montgomery, C. A. (1994). Corporate diversification. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 8(3), 163-178.

105

Palich, L. E., Cardinal, L. B., & Miller, C. C. (2000). Curvilinearity in the diversificationperformance linkage: An examination of over three decades of research. Strategic
Management Journal,21(2), 155-174.
Parker, S. C. (2006). Learning about the unknown: How fast do entrepreneurs adjust their
beliefs? Journal of Business Venturing, 21(1), 1-26.
Penrose, E. T., Pitelis, C. N., & MyiLibrary. (1995). The theory of the growth of the
firm Oxford University Press Oxford.
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence
from small business data. The Journal of Finance, 49(1), pp. 3-37.
Petkova, A. P. (2009). A theory of entrepreneurial learning from performance
errors. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 5(4), 345-367.
Petrunia, R. (2008). Does Gibrat’s law hold? evidence from canadian retail and
manufacturing firms. Small Business Economics, 30(2), 201-214.
Politis, D. (2005). The process of entrepreneurial learning: A
framework. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(4), 399-424.

conceptual

Porter, M. E. (1998). The competitive advantage of nations: With a new introduction Free
Pr.
Ramanujam, V., & Varadarajan, P. (1989). Research on corporate diversification: A
synthesis. Strategic Management Journal, 10(6), 523-551.
Renski, H. (2012). Entrepreneurial human capital, industry clusters, and new firm
survival investigating the sources of localization in the study of start-up business
survival. Working Papers, Paper Prepared for Presentation and Discussion at the
Kauffman Firm Survey Research Conference July 2012,
Robb, A., Ballou, J., DesRoches, D., Potter, F., Zhao, Z., & Reedy, E. (2009). An
overview of the kauffman firm Survey–Results from the 2004-2007 data. Kauffman
Foundation,
Robb, A., Reedy, E. J., Ballou, J., DesRoches, D., Potter, F., & Zhao, Z. (2010). An
overview of the kauffman firm survey: Results from the 2004-2008. SSRN eLibrary,
Robb, A., & Robinson, D. T. (2008). The capital structure decisions of new firms:
Second in a series of reports using data from the kauffman firm survey. SSRN
eLibrary,

106

Romanelli, E. (1989). Environments and strategies of organization start-up: Effects on
early survival. Administrative Science Quarterly, , 369-387.
Roper, S., & Hart, M. (2005). Small firm growth and public policy in the UK: What
exactly are the connections? RP0504, Aston Business School, University of Aston,
Birmingham,
Rumelt, R. P. (1974). Strategy, structure, and economic performance Division of
Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.
Rumelt, R. P. (1982). Diversification strategy and profitability. Strategic Management
Journal, 3(4), 359-369.
Sandvig, J. C. (2000). The role of technology in small firm diversification. The Journal of
Technology Transfer, 25(2), 157-168.
Singh, M., & Faircloth, S. (2005). The impact of corporate debt on long term investment
and firm performance. Applied Economics, 37(8), 875-883.
Smith, K. G., Collins, C. J., & Clark, K. D. (2005). Existing knowledge, knowledge
creation capability, and the rate of new product introduction in high-technology
firms. Academy of Management Journal,
Smith, S. W. (2010). Beg, borrow, and deal? entrepreneurship and financing in new firm
innovation. SSRN eLibrary, (SSRN)
Teece, D. J. (1998). Capturing value from knowledge assets. California Management
Review, 40(3)
Therrien, P. (2003). Empowering employees: A route to innovation Statistics Canada;
Canada. Human Resources Development Canada.
Thompson, P. (2005). Selection and firm survival: Evidence from the shipbuilding
industry, 1825-1914. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(1), 26-36.
Thompson, P. (2011). Necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs through the business
cycle. Working Papers, Florida International University
Trajtenberg, M. (1990). A penny for your quotes: Patent citations and the value of
innovations. The Rand Journal of Economics, 21(1), pp. 172-187.
Van Praag, C. M., & Versloot, P. H. (2007). What is the value of entrepreneurship? A
review of recent research. Small Business Economics, 29(4), 351-382.

107

Verwijmeren, P., & Derwall, J. (2010). Employee well-being, firm leverage, and
bankruptcy risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(5), 956-964.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource‐based view of the firm. Strategic Management
Journal, 5(2), 171-180.
Worldwide, W. W. (2002). Human capital index®: Human capital as a lead indicator of
shareholder value. Washington, DC,
Yelle, L. E. (1979). The learning curve: Historical review and comprehensive
survey. Decision Sciences, 10(2), 302-328.
Zoghi, C., Mohr, R. D., & Meyer, P. B. (2010). Workplace organization and
innovation. Canadian
Journal
of
Economics/Revue
Canadienne
d'Économique, 43(2), 622-639.

108

APPENDICES
Appendix 1
1. Methods of starting business:
(a) How was the business started
i. A new business, branch or subsidiary owned by an existing business
ii. A business inherited from someone else
iii. A new, independent business created by a single person or a team of
people
iv. The purchase of an existing business
v.
The purchase of a franchise
vi. An organization designed for social and charitable objectives and
legally established as a ?not-for-profit
vii. Or, the business started some other way
(b) Did you pay FICA
(c) What is the legal status of business
(d) Verify the NAICS Code
2. What is the main reason the (name of original business) is out of business: Five ways
of going out of business were identified
(a) Sold to Another Business Start-up
(b) Merged with Another Business
(c) Temporarily Stopped Operations
(d) Permanently Out of Business
(e) Other
3. Owner Characteristics:
(a) How many individuals or entities owned the business? Please include all
individuals or entities who owned shares in the business.
(b) Of the total number of owners as of December 31, how many owners actively
helped to run the business?
4. Ten dollar value categories are used in KFS for recording firms’ revenue, profit, asset
and total wages to avoid revealing KFS firms’ sensitive financial information.
(a) $0
(b) $500 or less
(c) $501 to $1,000
(d) $1,001 to $3,000
(e) $3,001 to $5,000
(f) $5,001 to $10,000
(g) $10,001 to $25,000
(h) $25,001 to $100,000
(i) $100,001 to $1 million
(j) $1,000,001 or more
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5. Total Intellectual Property Variables:
(a) These variables create a total number of patents, copyrights, or trademarks the
businesses possessed at the time of each interview. For each type of
intellectual property, the variables were constructed using data from the
following questions:
(b) “Indicator” questions, such as Question D3a (“Does the business have any
patents?”)
(c) “Exact value” measures, such as Question D3b (“How many patents does the
business have?”)
6. Number of Employees:
(a) Total Number of Employees: Not Counting owner(s), on December 31, how
many people worked for (name of original business).
i. Please Include all full- and part-time employees, but exclude workers
who work for the business either full- or part-time but are not on the
business' official payroll.
(b) Full Time Employees: ...And of those (number reported from 6a), how many
were full time?
(c) Part Time Employees: ...And of those (number reported from 6a), how many
were part time?
7. Number of Employees responsible for research and development:
(a) On December 31, how many employees, if any, did (name business) have who
are primarily responsible for Research and Development on mew products or
services? Please include only full- and part-time employees, but exclude
workers who work for the business either full- or part-time but are not on the
business' official payroll.
8. Business Organization and HR Benefits:
(a) As of December 31, did (name business) offer
i. a bonus plan for full-time employees/part-time employees
ii. alternative work schedules for full-time employees/part-time
employees
iii. health insurance plan for full-time employees/part-time employees
iv. other benefits for full-time employees/part-time employees
v.
paid sick days for full-time employees/part-time employees
vi. paid vacation for full-time employees/part-time employees
vii. a retirement plan full-time employees/part-time employees
viii. stock options for full-time employees/part-time employees
ix. tuition reimbursement for full-time employees/part-time employees
9. To identify the main owner:
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(a) Hours: During the time (name business) was in business during the year, how
many hours in an average week did owner spend working at (name business)?
(Specify ranges)
(b) Work Experience: How many years of work experience have you had in this
industry—the one in which (name business) competes?
(c) Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed so far?
(d) Equity Percentage: What is the percentage owned by owner 1to 14?
(e) How old will you be on your next birthday? (Specify ranges)
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VITA
INDU KHURANA
January 15, 1981

Born, New Delhi, India
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Masters of Arts, Economics
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Masters in Philosophy, Commerce
Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi
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2003

Master of Commerce
Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi
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2010

Doctoral Candidate in Economics
Florida International University
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